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THE CASE OF THE PRISONERS AND THE 
ORIGINS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
WILLIAM MICHAEL TREANORt 
INTRODUCTION 
For over one hundred years, scholars have closely studied the 
handful of cases in which state courts, in the years before the 
Federal Constitutional Convention, confronted the question 
whether they had the power to declare laws invalid. 1 Interest in 
t Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University; B.A., Yale College, I979; A.M., 
Harvard University, I 982; J.D., Yale Law School, I 985. 
I would like to thank the following people for their comments and suggestions: 
Akhil Amar, Marc Arkin, Deborah Denno, Jill Fisch, Martin Flaherty,James Fleming, 
Michael Gerhardt, Abner Greene, Tracy Higgins, Robert Kaczorowski, James Kainen, 
William Nelson, Russell Pearce, and Georgene Vairo. I am particularly grateful to 
Morton Horwitz for his invaluable guidance and advice on this project. Fordham Law 
School provided generous research support for this Article. Heather McCaffrey, 
Jenny Uber Kincaid, Chris St. Jeanos, and Frank Monaco supplied superb research 
assistance. I would also like to thank the Earl Gregg Swem Library at the College of 
William and Mary and the Library of Congress for the use of their manuscript 
collections, and, in particular, I would like to thank Margaret Cook of the Earl Gregg 
Swem Library for her extraordinary assistance in the use of the papers of St. George 
Tucker. Finally, I would like to thank the participants in the N.Y.U. Legal History 
Colloquium for their helpful reactions when this Article was presented at the 
Colloquium. 
This Article is part of what will be a larger study of revolutionary-era judicial 
review cases. That study will use these cases to examine competing conceptions of 
constitutional interpretation and of judicial review prior to ratification of the Federal 
Constitution. It will also explore the extent to which judicial review was accepted 
(and opposed) in different states and the factors that contributed to these divergent 
responses. 
1 In I 953, Professor William Crosskey described nine revolutionary-era cases as 
comprising the "traditional list" of potential precedents for judicial review. 2 
WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES 944 (I 953). As Professor Suzanna Sherry has observed, "[Crosskey's] 
list of cases has not been improved upon." Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwrillen 
Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. II27, II35 n.36 (I987). 
Most of these nine cases do not appear in reporters, and in one instance it 
appears that a rumored decision did not in fact exist. Because of different interpreta-
tions of the evidence, scholars have claimed that as many as six of them are cases in 
which a court asserted the power to invalidate a statute, see CHARLES G. HAINES, THE 
AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 88-I2I (2d ed. I959), and, at the other 
extreme, that none of these cases is a precedent for judicial review, see I LOUIS B. 
BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY SI-72, 53I-63 (1932). The following is, in 
chronological order, the "traditional list," including the reporter in which the case 
appears or, if it does not appear in a reporter, the published source or sources 
containing the fullest account of the case: Josiah Philips's Case (Va. I778), described 
(491) 
492 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143:491 
these early cases began in the late nineteenth century as one aspect 
of the larger debate about the legitimacy of judicial review, a debate 
triggered by the increasing frequency with which the Supreme Court 
and state courts were invalidating economic and social legislation. 
The lawyers, political scientists, and historians who initially 
unearthed the case law from the 1770s and 1780s used the product 
of their research to argue either that judicial review was sufficiently 
established at the time of the Federal Constitutional Convention so 
as to be part of the original understanding, even though the 
Constitution makes no mention of judicial review or, alternatively, 
that Marbury v. Madison 2 was an act of judicial usurpation. 3 In this 
century, scholars have continued to study these cases as part of that 
debate. 1 More recently, the cases have been at the core of the 
in 2 CROSSKEY, supra, at 944-48;] ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTAR-
IES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA bk. 
I, pt. 1, app. at 293 (1803): Holmes v. Walton (N J. 1780), described in Austin Scott, 
Holmes v. Walton: The New jersey Precedent, 4 AM. IIIST. REV. 456 (1899); Common-
wealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5 (1782) (this case was contemporaneously known as 
the Case of the Prisoners and is the subject of this Article); Rutgers v. Waddington (N.Y. 
City Mayor's Ct. 1784), Teprinted in ] JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., THE LAW PRACTICE OF 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 393-419 (1964); HENRY B. 
DAWSON, THE CASE OF ELIZABETH RUTGERS VERSUS JOSHUA WADDINGTON (1866) 
(providing a compilation of relevant materials); Symsbury Case, 1 Kirby 444 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. 1785 ); Trevett v. Weeden (R.I. 1786), described in JAMES M. VARNUM, THE 
CASE, TREVETT V. WEEDEN: ON INFORMATION AND COMPL\INT, FOR REFUSING PAPER 
BILLS IN PAYMENT FOR BUTCHER'S MEAT, !N MARKET, AT PAR WITH SPECIE (1787); 
"Ten-Pound Act" Cases (N.II. 1786), described in 2 CROSSKEY, supra, at 968-71; Bayard 
v. Singleton, 1 N.C. (Mart.) 48 (1787). The ninth potential judicial review case, a 
Massachusetts case referred to in a letter from J.B. Cutting to Thomas Jefferson, 
appears to have never occurred; Cutting apparently misread a newspaper article 
describing one of theN ew I Iampshi1·e "Ten-Pound Act" cases. See 2 CROSS KEY, supra, 
at 961-62; A.C. Goodell, An Early Constitutional Case in Massachusetts, 7 HARV. L. REV. 
415 (1894). 
2 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
3 See ROBERT L. CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 48-55, 
166-75 ( 1989) (discussing late-19th-century examination ofrevolutional·y-erajudicial 
review cases and debate about judicial review). Among the most important books and 
articles from this period are the following: BRINTON COXE, AN ESSAY ON JUDICIAL 
POWER AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION 216-71 (1893); ] JAMES B. THAYER, 
CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 55-80 (1895); Charles B. Elliot, The Legislatures and 
the Courts: The Power to Declare Statutes Unconstitutional, 5 POL. SCI. Q. 224, 233-39 
( I890); Goodell, supra note I; William M. Meigs, The Relation of the judicimy to the 
Constitution, 19 AM. L. REV. 175 (I885); Scott, supra note I; James B. Thayer, The 
Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. I29, 
I3I-40 (1893); William P. Trent, The Case of josiah Philips, I AM. HIST. REV. 444 
(1896). 
4 For examples of 20th-century studies of ,-evolutionary-era cases, see RAOUL 
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controversy over whether the original understanding permits the use 
of extraconstitutional sources, such as natural law, in judicial 
review. 5 
Given that judicial review in the revolutionary era is one of the 
most closely scrutinized subjects in legal history, it has long 
appeared that any significant primary sources from these cases had 
been analyzed. Indeed, it has been over forty years since a new 
source has been brought to bear on the study of revolutionary-era 
judicial review. 6 Remarkably, however, there are two sets of 
BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 36-46 (1969); 1 BOUDIN, supra note 1, at 
51-72, 531-63; CLINTON, supra note 3, at 48-55; 2 CROSSKEY, supra note 1, at 938-75; 
1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: 
ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 125-42 (1971); HAINES, supra note 1, at 
88-121; LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION 89-99 
( 1 988); SYLVIA SNOWJSS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 13-53 
(1990); SHANNON C. STIMSON, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN THE LAW 110-17 
(1 990); CHARLES WARREN, CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE SUPREME COURT 
43-48 (1 925); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-
1787, at 453-63 (1 969); L.B. Boudin, Government by judiciary, 26 POL. SCI. Q. 238, 211-
47 (1911); EdwardS. Corwin, The Establishment of judicial Review, 9 MICH. L. REV. 
102, 110-20 (1910); Report of the Committee upon the Duty of Courts to Refuse to t.xecute 
Statutes in Contravention of the Fundamental Law, 38 N.Y. ST. B. Ass'N PROC. 230,280-
87 (1915); Jesse Turner, A Phantom Precedent, 48 AM. L. REV. 321, 321-41 (1911); 
Jesse Turner, Four Fugitive Cases from the Realm of American Constitutional Law, 49 AM. 
L. REV. 818, 818-51 (1915); Charles Warren, Earliest Cases of judicial Review of State 
Legislation by Federal Courts, 32 YALE LJ. 15, 15-28 (1922). 
5 See, e.g., Calvin R. Massey, The Natural Law Component of the Ninth Amendment, 
61 U. CJN. L. REV. 49, 63-73 (1992); Helen K. Michael, The Role of Natural Law in 
Early American Constitutionalism: Did the Founders Contemplate judicial Enforcement of 
"Unwritten" Individual Rights?, 69 N.C. L. REV. 421,448-57 (1991); Robert E. Riggs, 
Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 941, 977-80; Sherry, supra note 1, 
at 1134-46. 
6 The last time a new primary source was first analyzed was 1952, when David 
Mays discussed Edmund Pendleton's notes in the Case of the Prisoners in the context 
of his account of the case in his biography of Pendleton. See 2 D.-WID J. MAYS, 
EDMUND PENDLETON, 1721-1803: A BIOGRAPHY 187-202 (1952). Mays subsequently 
published Pendleton's notes. See Edmund Pendleton, Pendleton's Account of "The Case 
of the Prisoners," in 2 THE LETTERS AND PAPERS OF EDMUND PENDLETON, 1734-1803, 
at 416-27 (David J. Mays ed., 1 967). Cross key made use of Pendleton's notes in their 
unpublished form. See 2 CROSSKEY, supra note 1, at 958-60. They have been ignored, 
however, in a number of the most important recent accounts of revolutionary-era 
judicial review cases, all of which have placed exclusive reliance on Call's account. SPe 
CLINTON, supra note 3, at 49; SNOWJSS, supra note 4, at 17-24, 33; WOOD, supm note 
4, at 454-55; Sherry, supra note 1, at 1143-45. None of these accounts mentions the 
published notes. Sherry, in a footnote, states that Cross key called into question Call's 
report, but she adds that Mays, in his biography, had used Pendleton's notes "to 
support Call's reporting." ld. at 1143-44 n.90. In fact, as indicated in the next 
section of this chapter, see infra part I, Call's and Pendleton's accounts differ 
dramatically, and, where they conflict, Mays invariably followed Pendleton. 
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unpublished attorneys' notes that have been preserved in library 
collections of personal papers that have never been analyzed by 
scholars of judicial review: the notes of Edmund Randolph and of 
St. George Tucker in Virginia's 1782 Case of the Prisoners (which 
reporter Daniel Call entitled Commonwealth v. Caton 7 when he 
published a report of the case in 1827).8 These notes are signifi-
cant in part because their authors were to become major legal 
figures and their early thinking on judicial review is therefore of 
value to constitutional historians. As a member of the Federal 
Constitutional Convention, Randolph proposed the Virginia Plan, 
the principal source for the Federal Constitution, and he subse-
quently was the first United States Attorney General and, later, 
Thomas Jefferson's successor as Secretary of State.9 Although now 
largely forgotten, Tucker was a member of the Virginia Court of 
Appeals, a federal judge, 10 and, in the words of Dean Paul Carring-
7 8 Va. ( 4 Call) 5 (1782). 
8 See Edmund Randolph, Rough Draft of Argument in Respondent v. Lamb (the 
Case of the Prisoners) (original in 91 James Madison Papers, Manuscript Division, 
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.) (copy on file with author); St. George Tucker, 
Notes of Oral Argument in the Case of the Prisoners (original in Papers of St. George 
Tucker, Manuscripts Department, Earl Gregg Swem Library, College of William and 
Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia) (copy on file with author). 
It should be noted that, in addition to being overlooked by scholars of judicial 
review, these two sets of notes have been essentially overlooked by other scholars and 
neither lawyer's arguments for judicial review nor discussions of constitutional 
construction have been discussed in print. Randolph's notes were sent to Madison 
as an attachment to his letter to Madison of March 7, 1783. The notes were filed in 
Madison's Papers at the Library of Congress separately from the cover letter, which 
may explain why the notes have not been focused on earlier. The cover letter, unlike 
Randolph's notes, has been published. See Letter from Edmund Randolph to James 
Madison (Mar. 7, 1783), in 6 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 318, 318-19 (William T. 
Hutchinson & William M.E. Rachal eds., 1969) [hereinafter MADISON PAPERS]. The 
accompanying editorial footnote has several sentences summarizing Randolph's 
conception of the Virginia Constitution as fundamental law, but says nothing about 
Randolph's position on judicial review or on how to construe a constitution. See 
William T. Hutchinson & William M.E. Rachal, Notes to Letter from Edmund 
Randolph, in 6 MADISON PAPERS, supra, at 321 n.8. Prior to this Article, this brief 
note appears to be the only published discussion of any part of the contents of 
Randolph's notes. 
Apparently, the only prior discussion of the argument in Tucker's notes is found 
in Charles Cullen's biography of Tucker. Cullen simply observed that Tucker "made 
a strong argument for ... judicial review" in the Case of the Prisoners, without stating 
what that argument was. CHARLES T. CULLEN, ST. GEORGE TUCKER AND LAW IN 
VIRGINIA, 1772-1804, at 36 (1987). 
9 See JOHN J. REARDON, EDMUND RANDOLPH: A BiOGRAPHY 98-99, 189-91 (1974). 
10 See CULLEN, supra note 8, at 189. 
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ton, "arguably the most important American legal scholar of the 
first half of the nineteenth century." 11 
Far more significant, however, is the fact that Randolph's and 
Tucker's notes are perhaps the best evidence that we have about 
how people at the time of the Constitution's drafting thought a 
court should construe a constitution, a subject of critical concern to 
originalists today. These notes are apparently the only surviving 
sources from the revolutionary era in which attorneys in a case in 
which a statute's validity was challenged discussed how to interpret 
constitutional provisions. Similarly, other than in the Case of the 
Prisoners, none of the judicial opinions of which we have a record 
confronts the issue of constitutional construction. The absence of 
consideration of this issue is not surprising because these cases 
primarily involved challenges to statutes based on violations of 
unwritten fundamental law, such as the traditional right to a jury, 
rather than on violations of written constitutions. 12 Furthermore, 
as Professor Charles Lofgren has observed, "[t]he members of the 
Philadelphia Convention were silent about how they expected the 
Constitution to be interpreted. "13 Adding to the value of Ran-
dolph's and Tucker's analyses is the fact that they both argued out 
of personal conviction, rather than to advance the interests of a 
client. Tucker, appearing before the court as an amicus, was 
arguing for himself. More surprisingly, Randolph, although 
contending as state attorney general that the challenged statute 
should be upheld, informed the court that he was duty bound to 
11 Paul D. Carrington, The Revolutionary Idea of University Legal Education, 3I WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 527, 540 (1990). 
12 See Sherry, supra note I, at II35-46 (discussing cases). The one case other than 
the Case of the Prisoners to turn clearly on a written constitution was Bayard v. 
Singleton, I N.C. (Mart.) 48 (1787), but the treatment of the conflict between statute 
and constitution was conclusory. The statute at issue barred property owners from 
bringing suit to recover land confiscated by the state. North Carolina's constitution 
guaranteed the right to a trial by jury. See N.C. CONST. of I776, art. XIV, reprinted 
in 5 FRANCIS N. THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS COLONIAL 
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES 
NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2788 (1909). 
Without analysis, the court asserted that the challenged statute and state constitution 
were in conflict because "by the constitution every citizen had undoubtedly a right to 
a decision of his property by a trial by jury." Bayard, I N.C. (Mart.) at 49. 
13 Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 CONSTITU-
TIONAL COMMENTARY 77, 79 (1988); see also H. Jefferson Powell, The Original 
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 904 (I985) ("[T]he Philadel-
phia framers did not discuss in any detail how they intended their end product to be 
interpreted .... "). 
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disclose his personal belief that a statute could be declared 
unconstitutional. In short, neither set of notes reflects partisan 
bias. 
For originalists, then, these notes are a uniquely valuable guide 
to background understandings of how the Constitution was to be 
interpreted. What makes them of dramatic significance for 
originalists is that, as this Article will show, the notes reflect views 
of constitutional interpretation that are at odds with leading 
modern scholarship on the original understanding of the Framers 
on matters such as the significance of original intent, the judicial 
obligation to follow constitutional text strictly, and the extent to 
which courts should defer to legislatures. Thus, this new evidence 
is not only the best evidence we have about constitutional construc-
tion at the time of the framing, but it directly challenges received 
notions about the original understanding of that subject. Given the 
importance of originalism to modern constitutional jurisprudence, 
this challenge has important current ramifications in terms of how 
the Constitution should be understood. 
Apart from the specific value of these notes, the Case of the 
Prisoners-in which three condemned men claimed that Virginia's 
Treason Statute violated the state constitution-merits careful study 
because it was in all likelihood the earliest case in which an 
American court, after independence, faced the issue of whether it 
could declare a statute unconstitutional, and because the case 
provided the occasion on which an astonishing number of important 
figures were forced to confront that issue for the first time. Two of 
the judges, George Wythe and John Blair, joined Randolph as 
representatives of Virginia at the Federal Constitutional Convention. 
John Francis Mercer, one of the lawyers who, like Tucker, argued as 
an amicus in the case, attended the Convention as a delegate from 
Maryland. James Madison was also intimately familiar with the case. 
He corresponded with both Chancellor Edmund Pendleton, the 
presiding judge, and Randolph about the case and acquired 
Pendleton's notes of his opinion. After repeated requests from 
Madison, Randolph sent him a part of the rough draft of his 
argument. 14 To the extent, then, that the early cases deserve 
examination in order to determine what arguments concerning 
14 For the list of participants in the Constitutional Convention, see 3 THE RECORDS 
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 587-90 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937). 
For discussion of the participants in the Case of the Prisoners, see infra part I. On the 
Case of the Prisoners as the first judicial review case, see infra note 212. 
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judicial review the Framers were exposed to and what their 
reactions to those arguments were, the Case of the Prisoners is worthy 
of close focus; it is probable that no other case was so well-known 
to such a large group of Framers. To the extent that the early cases 
merit study in order to understand Marbury, the Case of the Prisoners 
is particularly worthy of attention: apparently present among the 
crowd that gathered in the courtroom to hear the decision was John 
Marshall, then a young Virginia lawyer. 15 
Part I of this Article draws on Randolph's and Tucker's notes as 
well as other primary sources, such as letters, government records, 
and Pendleton's notes, to provide a detailed account of the Case of 
the Prisoners. These records indicate that two of the eight judges on 
the court of appeals took the position that the court had the power 
to declare statutes unconstitutional-one of the judges being 
Marshall's former law professor, George Wythe-and these may have 
been the first American judges to take this position. Only one 
judge held that the court did not have this power, and the others 
did not reach the issue. 
Part II discusses the relevance of the case to a number of critical 
originalist legal debates. Perhaps most significant is the case's 
bearing on the question whether the founding generation believed 
original intent relevant to constitutional interpretation. In the 
leading article on the topic, The Original Understanding of Original 
Intent, H. Jefferson Powell argued that the original understanding 
was that the Framers' subjective intent was irrelevant. 16 Under-
standably (given that he did not have access to Randolph's and 
Tucker's notes, the only surviving revolutionary-era legal documents 
that seriously examined the issue), Powell based his view of the 
background understanding animating the Framers on inferences 
from schools of interpretation that he believed available to the 
Framers, and he did not probe revolutionary-era case law. Tucker 
and Randolph, however, both appealed to original intent, and 
Tucker, more to the point, specifically invoked the subjective intent 
of the state constitution's framers. The case thus suggests that the 
Framers of the Federal Constitution had available to them a view of 
interpretation under which their subjective intent was directly 
relevant to constitutional construction. 
15 See Charles F. Hobson et al., Introduction to 5 THE PAPERS OF jOHN MARSHALL 
at xxiii,lvii-lviii {Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 1974) [hereinafter MARSHALL PAPERS]. 
16 Powell, supra note 13. 
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More broadly, where Powell argues that the only hermeneutic 
traditions available to the Framers were completely or predominant-
ly focused on text, the Case of the Prisoners suggests that many of the 
founding generation were "anti-literalists" 17 who believed constitu-
tions should be interpreted in light of their spirit, even when the 
spirit was at odds with the text. Indeed, appeals to the spirit of the 
Virginia Constitution are central to the arguments advanced in the 
case and indicate that extraconstitutional sources (including, but not 
limited to, evidence of original intent) were considered relevant to 
constitutional interpretation. 
At the same time, the Case of the Prisoners challenges the 
conclusion reached by scholars who argue that early theories of 
judicial review embodied a constrained conception of the judicial 
role. While Randolph's argument reflects a limited notion of 
judicial review, Tucker's argument rests on an expansive view of 
judicial review. His argument, in conjunction with subsequent 
Virginia case law, demonstrates the presence of an aggressive 
conception of judicial review in the early republic. This Article thus 
suggests that an activist approach to judicial review can claim 
originalist support. Professor Suzanna Sherry has previously 
provided originalist support for judicial activism, but her claim in 
this regard is that revolutionary-era judges applied natural law. 18 
In contrast, this Article delineates an expansive conception of the 
judicial role based on construction of a written constitution in 
accordance with its spirit. It therefore significantly contributes to 
the debate about the founding generation's understanding of the 
scope of judicial review by offering evidence of judicial activism 
grounded, not in natural law, but in a broad reading of a constitu-
tion. From the perspective of originalism, this claim is of signal 
importance since activist modern constitutional jurisprudence 
involves expansive readings of constitutional text, not applications 
of natural law. 19 
17 The term is Professor Morton Horwitz's. See Morton]. Horwitz, The Constitution 
of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 32, 49 
( 1993); see also William M. Treanor & Gene B. Sperling, Prospective Overruling and the 
Revival of"Unconstitutional" Statutes, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1902, 1942-43 & n.154 (1993) 
(discussing competing conceptions in ratification debates on the Constitution's 
flexibility). 
18 See Sherry, supra note 1, at 1178. 
19 See id. ("The formal analysis of modern constitutional law is pervaded by the 
legacy of judicial positivism, which has all but eradicated notions of any link between 
constitutional law and natural law."). 
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Finally, study of the Case of the Prisoners and its aftermath casts 
new light on the issue that, over one hundred years ago, lay at the 
core of the initial interest in the early cases and that continues to be 
the subject of sharp controversy-the legitimacy of Chief Justice 
Marshall's decision in Marbury. Marbury and Marshall have tra-
ditionally been viewed in the context of national constitutional 
history and national acceptance of judicial review. This Article 
argues that they can also profitably be viewed in the context of the 
constitutional history of Virginia, Marshall's home state. Much of 
the enduring debate about Marbury and Marshall's motives in the 
case-and particularly the question whether the Chief Justice 
embraced judicial review because he desired a way in which a 
Federalist Judiciary could control the Republican Executive and 
Congress-reflects the view that judicial review was not established 
in this country at the time of the Constitution's ratification. That 
view grows in part out of the fact that scholars have previously 
devoted much of their focus to the three cases which, before this 
Article, appeared to have generated the largest body of surviving 
primary source material: Rutgers v. Waddington, 20 Trevett v. Weed-
en,21 and Bayard v. Singleton. 22 In New York, Rhode Island, and 
North Carolina, the states in which these cases were decided, there 
was significant opposition to judicial review, suggesting a national 
pattern in which judicial review was highly contested. But the Case 
of the Prisoners and the subsequent history of judicial review in 
Virginia indicate that that statute did not fit that pattern. Although 
the court in the Case of the Prisoners did not hold a statute invalid, 
and therefore the case is not a precedent for judicial review in the 
legal sense, the reaction to the case shows that judicial review did 
not provoke serious controversy in the state. Moreover, after the 
Case of the Prisoners but before Marbury, the Virginia judiciary 
asserted the power to review statutes, and every speaker at the 
20 N.Y. City Mayor's Ct. 1784, reprinted in 1 GOEBEL, supra note 1, at 393-419. 
21 R.I. 1786, described in VARNUM, supra note 1. 
22 I N.C. (Mart.) 48 (1787). The focus on these three cases can be traced back at 
least to Brinton Coxe's 1893 study: these were the three cases he treated in detail. 
See COXE, supra note 3, at 223-69. More recently, Gordon Wood in The Creation of 
the American Republic 1776-1787, the most influential modern revolutionary-era 
constitutional history, also focused on these three cases in his treatment of judicial 
review. See WOOD, supra note 4, at 453-63. For examples of other studies treating 
these cases (or a subset of them) as the most relevant revolutionary-era cases, see 
CLINTON, supra note 3, at 48-54; LEVY, supra note 4, at 93-99; STIMSON, supra note 4, 
at 110-17; Boudin, supra note 4, at 245-47. 
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Virginia ratifying convention (including Marshall) who discussed the 
legitimacy of judicial review endorsed it. 
This Article suggests that the structure of Virginia's political and 
legal culture was such that judicial assertions of the power to 
invalidate statutes were accepted as legitimate and that that culture 
helps explain why Virginia was the one state in which judicial review 
had won broad support well before Marbury. Apart from his 
politics, and apart from whether or not there was a consensus at the 
time of the framing in favor of judicial review, Marshall was 
predisposed to embrace judicial review because he was a product of 
that political and legal culture. To put it another way, in MarbU?y, 
the Chief Justice was applying the lesson that he had learned over 
twenty years before when he heard his former law professor's 
judicial opinion in the Case of the Prisoners, and he was ensuring that 
the national judiciary had a power that his state's judiciary had long 
exercised without challenge. 
l. THE CASE OF THE PRISONERS 
Facing execution for treason, the three petitioners in the Case 
of the Prisoners contended that they had received an effective pardon 
from the Virginia House of Delegates and that Virginia's Treason 
Act, which provided that an individual could be pardoned only with 
the approval of both the House of Delegates and the Virginia 
Senate, was void because it was contrary to the state constitution. 
This section traces the history of the case, from its background, 
through the arguments of the various attorneys who played a part 
in the case, the decision of the Virginia Court of Appeals-which, by 
a divided vote, ruled against the prisoners-and, finally, the 
aftermath of the case. In particular, this section will focus on the 
four legal analyses of which a detailed record has been preserved: 
the arguments presented by St. George Tucker and Edmund 
Randolph before the court of appeals and the opinions of Chancel-
lor George Wythe (one of the two jurists to pronounce in favor of 
judicial review) and Chancellor Edmund Pendleton (who reserved 
the issue). 
A. Background 
As the Revolutionary War drew to a close, the Virginia state 
government began the systematic prosecution of Virginians who had 
been prominent supporters of the Crown during the war. In 1781, 
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John Caton, James Lamb,23 and Joshua Hopkins, the three prison-
ers in the Case of the Prisoners, had assisted the British troops who 
temporarily controlled much of the southeastern part of the state. 
They were convicted of treason in separate trials held in Princess 
Anne County in May and June 1782, and they were then taken to 
Richmond for sentencing.24 There, on June 15, 1782, the Virginia 
General Court sentenced them to death. 25 
The three men petitioned the Virginia House of Delegates for 
a pardon. The House voted in favor of a resolution that the men 
"be and remain Pardoned of the offence of which they are at-
tained, "26 subject to the condition that they be banished from 
Virginia. 27 It then submitted the resolution to the Virginia Senate 
for its concurrence, but the Senate voted against issuing the 
pardon. 28 
On the day that the sheriff was to hang Caton, Lamb, and 
Hopkins, the prisoners produced a copy of the House resolution, 
without any indication that the resolution had been forwarded to 
the Senate or that it had been rejected by that body. 29 The 
prisoners claimed that the pardon was valid and entitled them to 
their immediate release. 30 Given the absence of any indication as to 
how the Senate had treated the petition, the sheriff was apparently 
uncertain as to how to proceed. As Chancellor Pendleton put it in 
his notes on the case, the sheriff "prudently respited the Execution, 
but kept the Prisoners in Goal [sic], until the meeting of the 
General Court in October term. "31 
This conjunction of events-the House's approval of a pardon, 
the Senate's refusal to concur, and the three men's desperate 
attempts to use the House action in order to save their lives-
obviously was not the product of a plan to create a judicial review 
test case. But the fact that the prisoners would implore the general 
2
' In his report, Call states that Lamb's first name was John. See Commonwealth 
v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5, 5 (1782). Contemporaneous accounts, however, uniformly 
indicate that the defendant's first name was James. See 2 MAYS, supra note 6, at 384 
n.l. 
24 See 2 MAYS, supra note 6, at 188-89, 384 n.2. 
25 See id. at 189. 
26 Pendleton, supra note 6, at 416. 
27 See Randolph, supra note 8, at 1-2. 
28 See Pendleton, supra note 6, at 416; Letter from Edmund Randolph to James 
Madison Guly 18, 1782), in 4 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 8, at 422, 424. 
29 See Pendleton, supra note 6, at 417. 
'
0 See id. 
'I /d. 
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court to overturn a statute was apparent well before arguments were 
heard. OnJuly 18, 1782, Attorney General Randolph advised James 
Madison, "[a] late incident will probably try the fortitude of our 
judiciary, by calling upon them to say, whether a law, contrary to the 
constitution, is obligatory. "32 
The Treason Act made it clear that an individual convicted of 
treason could only be pardoned with the consent of both houses of 
the legislature. That statute provided: 
[T]he governor ... shall in no wise have or exercise a right of 
granting pardon to any person or persons convicted in manner 
aforesaid [including those convicted of treason], but may suspend 
the execution until the meeting of the general assembly, who shall 
determine whether such person or persons are proper objects of 
mercy or not, and order accordingly.33 
Although subsequent developments showed that the statute was 
not free from ambiguity, the relevant state constitutional provision 
seemed to indicate that, in those circumstances in which the 
legislature decided to strip the governor of the pardoning power, 
power had to be vested in the House of Delegates alone, rather than 
in both houses concurrently. The clause stated: 
[The governor] shall, with the advice of the Council of State, have 
the power of granting reprieves or pardons, except where the 
prosecution shall have been carried on by the House of Delegates, 
or the law shall otherwise particularly direct; in which case, no 
reprieve or pardon shall be granted, but by resolve of the House 
of Delegates.34 
Thus, the state constitution, which had been framed in 1776, 
seemed to provide that the House of Delegates alone had the power 
to pardon, while the statute, which had been enacted later that year, 
clearly established that a resolution by the House of Delegates was 
insufficient to effect a pardon and that the agreement of the Senate 
was also necessary. 
When the general court convened in October 1782, Attorney 
General Randolph requested the issuance of a new order for the 
~ 2 Letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison Quly 18, 1782), in 4 MADISON 
PAPERS, supra note 8, at 422, 424. 
~~ An Act Declaring What Shall Be Treason, 1776 Va. Acts ch. III, reprinted in 9 
WILLIAM W. HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE: BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE 
LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE IN THE YEAR 1619, 
at 168 (1821). 
~• ld. at 115-16. 
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execution of the three men. In response, counsel for the prisoners 
presented the resolution of the House of Delegates. Unlike the 
version given to the sheriff, this copy indicated that the House had 
sent the order to the Senate for its concurrence, and the parties 
stipulated that the Senate had rejected the pardon. Counsel for the 
prisoners argued that under the state constitution the pardon was 
valid. Randolph countered that under the governing statute both 
houses had to agree to a pardon and that the proffered resolution, 
because it lacked the consent of the Senate, was not an effective 
pardon. 35 The general court was unsure how to resolve the ques-
tion whether the act and the constitution were in conflict and, if 
they were, whether the court should recognize the pardon issued by 
the House of Delegates. Judge Peter Lyons stated that he would 
rather resign his judgeship than hold a statute unconstitutional. 36 
But his was a minority view. The initial reaction of the majority was 
to find in favor of the prisoners on constitutional grounds. "I am 
firmly persuaded," Randolph informed Madison, "that the general 
court, had the question been taken, would have pronounced the 
nullity of the law, as being against the constitution."37 The court, 
however, ultimately decided not to decide the matter at once, but 
to adjourn for further consideration of the issue. When it recon-
vened, the general court again decided not to decide: Rather than 
issuing an order, the court determined that in view of its "[n]ovelty 
and difficulty" the case should be resolved by the highest court in 
the state, the Virginia Court of Appeals. 38 
35 See Pendleton, supra note 6, at 417. 
36 Ascription of this comment to Lyons is based on inference. In his opinion for 
the court of appeals, Wythe observed that "the other day" one of the judges had said 
that "he would sooner quit the bench" than hold a statute void as unconstitutional. 
Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5, 8 (1782). Presumably, Wythe was referring 
to a statement made during the course of the general court's proceedings, since all 
the opinions in the court of appeals were delivered on the same day. Although there 
is apparently no record of the various opinions in the general court, all the general 
court members also sat on the court of appeals, and Lyons was the only general court 
judge to state that a court could not invalidate a statute. Thus, it appears likely that 
Lyons was the judge to whom Wythe was referring and that Lyons had made the 
comment when the case was before the general court. See 2 MAYS, supra note 6, at 
385 n.12 (noting that Wythe surely referred to Lyons when he described the refusal 
of "one of the [general court] judges" to void an act of the Assembly). 
37 Letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison (Oct. 26, 1782), in 5 MADISON 
PAPERS, supra note 8, at 217, 217-18. 
38 Pendleton, supra note 6, at 417. 
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B. The Court of Appeals and Initial Proceedings 
Established in 1779, the Virginia Court of Appeals was made up 
of the sitting judges of the various courts of the state. 39 In 1782, 
its membership included the three chancellors of the court of 
equity, Edmund Pendleton, George Wythe, and John Blair; the 
judges of the general court, Chiefjudge Paul Carrington andjudges 
Bartholomew Dandridge, Peter Lyons, and james Mercer; and judge 
Richard Cary of the court of admiralty. 40 As the senior judge of 
the highest court of the state, the court of equity, Pendleton 
presided. 41 
There appears to have been sharp debate in political and legal 
circles over how the court of appeals should resolve the question 
whether a court had power to pronounce a statute void as unconsti-
tutional. The case "made such noise" before it was decided, 
Pendleton later wrote to Madison. 42 While their efforts did not 
succeed, a group of legislators urged the creation of a joint 
legislative-judicial committee to consider whether a court could hold 
a statute unconstitutional and to define the powers of the judiciary 
and the legislature. These legislators also proposed the creation of 
a council of revision "to keep the legislature in futur[ e] cases within 
its just limits."43 Apparently concerned that the court of appeals 
would invalidate the statute and that the legislature would then 
move to nullify the judiciary's action, Randolph welcomed this 
scheme as a way to avoid deadlock and turmoil. "[W]ithout an 
accommodation fou[n]ded upon a reasonable construction of the 
constitution," he wrote Madison, "the appeal must be made to the 
people." 44 So widespread was discussion of the matter before the 
court of appeals that a shorthand way of describing judicial review 
39 See An Act Constituting the Court of Appeals, 1779 Va. Acts ch. XXII, reprinted 
in 10 HENING, supra note 33, at 89, 90. For a discussion of the postrevolutionary 
Virginia court system, see Hobson et al., supra note 15, at xxvii-xxxiii. 
40 See Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) at 5 n. *. Ben Waller, the second judge of the court of 
admiralty, was entitled to sit on the court of appeals, but consistently refused to do 
so because of the travel involved. See Daniel Call, Bio-graphical Sketch of the Judges of 
the Court of Appeals, During the Paiod of this and the Succeeding Volumes of Reports, 8 Va. 
(4 Call) vii, xx-xxi (1833) (discussing Judge Waller). 
41 See Call, supra note 40, at vii-ix (discussing Judge Pendleton). 
42 Letter from Edmund Pendleton to James Madison (Dec. 9, 1782), in 5 MADISO:-< 
PAPERS, supra note 8, at 382, 382. 
43 Letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison (Oct. 26, 1782), in 5 MADISON 
PAPERS, supra note 8, at 217, 218 (alteration by editors of Madison Papers). 
44 ld. (second alteration by editors of Madison Papers). 
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developed. In letters and news accounts alike it was described 
simply as "the great constitutional question."45 
When the court convened on October 29, 1782, Pendleton 
scheduled argument for the 31st, and he said that the judges were 
interested in the answers to three questions. The first was jurisdic-
tional-whether the court of appeals could have jurisdiction in a 
criminal case. The other two questions concerned judicial review. 
Pendleton asked for a discussion of"( w ]hether a Court of Law could 
declare an Act of the Legislature void because it was repugnant to 
the Act for the Constitution of Government?" 46 He also asked for 
argument on whether the treason statute was "contrary" to the 
pardon clause in the constitution.47 To assist the members of the 
bench in their deliberations, Pendleton "expressed a Wish that the 
Gentlemen of the Bar, tho' not engaged as Counsel, would generally 
deliver their Sentiments upon the Questions then stated."48 
C. Randolph's Argument 
When the court reconvened on October 31st, the first attorney 
to argue was Attorney General Randolph, appearing on behalf of 
the State. It was to prove a remarkable argument. After the case 
was over, he promised Madison, "[a]s soon as I have state[d] the 
case in full, you shall receive a copy. "49 When he failed to fulfill his 
commitment promptly, Madison pressed him. "You will not forget 
a ... promise which your letter makes with respect [to] the case 
lately decided by the Court of Appeals," Madison reminded the 
Attorney General on November 19.50 On December 30, 1782, he 
wrote Randolph another letter, which concluded, "You have not I 
hope forgot your promise of the case agitated so much in Virga. 
45 See, e.g., Letter from Edmund Pendleton to James Madison (Nov. 8, 1782), in 
5 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 8, at 260, 261 ("The great constitutional question, as 
it was called in our papers .... "); Letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison 
(Nov. 2, 1782), in 5 MADISON PAPERS, supm note 8, at 230, 230 ("The great 
constitutional question, which was mentioned in my last letter .... "); Letter from 
Edmund Randolph to James Madison (Oct. 26, 1782), in 5 MADISON PAPERS, supm 
note 8, at 217, 217 ("The great constitutional question which I mentioned to you 
.... "). 
46 Pendleton, supra note 6, at 417. 
47 !d. 
48 !d. 
49 Letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison (Nov. 8, 1782), in 5 MADISON 
PAPERS, supra note 8, at 262, 263 (alteration by editors of Madison Papers). 
50 Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Nov. 19, 1782), in 5 
MADISON PAPERS, supm note 8, at 288, 290 (alteration by editors of Madison Papers). 
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Mr. Pendleton's state of it has been reed. by Mr. Qoseph Jones, a 
fellow member of the Continental Congress from Virginia] and has 
increased my curiosity to see yours. "51 Randolph responded on 
January 15, 1783: "I shall certainly transmit a state of the constitu-
tional question and argument, as soon as a mass of papers, now 
before me, is reduced. "52 On February 7, 1783, Randolph sheep-
ishly wrote: 
Your favor by yesterday's post would increase my importunity for 
a transcript of your extract from Mr. J-s [Gefferson's)] remarks, 
if I could assign a better apology for not sending you a state of the 
great question, than you can for not sending the transcript. But 
circumstanced, as we are in the bosom of urgent business, we must 
do these works at leisure.53 
Finally, on March 7, Randolph fulfilled his initial promise, after 
a fashion: 
Inclosed is a part of my notes on the question before the court of 
appeals. Inaccurate as they are (for they were the first rude sketch 
& the second is lost) you must content yourself with them. The 
remainder which is equally interesting ... shall be sent to you by 
the next post, if I can transcribe in time.54 
True to form, Randolph was evidently unable to "transcribe in 
time," and it appears that he never sent the remainder of his notes 
to Madison. The eleven pages that he sent-the first part of his 
initial draft of his argument-have never been published and have 
never been used by historians of judicial review. But they are the 
only evidence of what is one of the most striking aspects of the Case 
of the Prisoners: Advancing a position that was contrary to the 
51 Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Dec. 30, 1782), in 5 MADISON 
PAPERS, supra note 8, at 4 72, 4 74. 
52 Letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison Qan. 15, 1783), in 6 MADISON 
PAPERS, supra note 8, at 43, 43. 
53 Letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison (Feb. 7, 1783), in 6 MADISON 
PAPERS, supra note 8, at 207, 207-08. Randolph apparently was referring to 
Jefferson's memorandum to the Marquis de Barbe-Marbois, on which Madison had 
made notes. While that memorandum has not survived, it apparently set forth 
Jefferson's view that the Virginia Constitution of 1776 was not a true constitution 
because the voters who had elected delegates to the convention that framed the 
constitution had not intended them to frame a constitution. See William T. 
Hutchinson & William M.E. Rachal, Notes to Letter from Edmund Randolph to James 
Madison (Mar. 7, 1783), in 6 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 8, at 318, 320 n.7 
(discussing Jefferson's memorandum). 
54 Letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison (Mar. 7, 1783), in 6 MADISON 
PAPERS, supra note 8, at 318, 319. 
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prosecution's interest in upholding the statute, Randolph, the state 
attorney general, apparently argued that he believed that a court 
had the power to hold a statute void as unconstitutional. He 
contended that the statute and the constitution were not inconsis-
tent, and that the House of Delegate's pardon was void because it 
was contrary to the statute. Thus, he argued that the court should 
not block the prisoners' execution. But the notes indicate that 
Randolph argued that, had the legislature passed a statute that was 
inconsistent with the constitution, the statute could be declared 
void. 55 
Randolph's notes are particularly arresting because they bear 
evidence of his personal struggle to determine whether judicial 
review was valid. Indeed, the revisions that he made to the notes as 
he was writing them suggest that, as he worked out the argument, 
he reversed his initial position against judicial review. Although the 
notes are incomplete, it is a fair inference that he did not in the 
remaining part oppose judicial review considering that in the 
Federal Constitutional Convention he was one of the handful of 
clear proponents of judicial review, 56 listing among the desirable 
features of the Virginia Plan that the "natl Judiciary" would be one 
of the "Checks upon the Legv. and Ex. Powers. "57 He repeated 
this stance in the Virginia ratifying convention, declaring, that "[i]f 
Congress wish [sic] to aggrandise themselves by oppressing the 
people, the Judiciary must first be corrupted. "58 
55 This Article assumes that Randolph's notes reflect the essence of the argument 
that he actually made before the Virginia Court of Appeals. Presumably, if there was 
any significant discontinuity, he would have commented on it in his letter forwarding 
the notes to Madison, yet he did not. It should be added, however, that Call's report 
states that Randolph argued that "the court were [sic] not authorized to declare [the 
statute] void." Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5, 7 (1782). No further details 
are provided. Call's report, however, is apparently inaccurate with respect to the 
characterization of John Mercer's argument, see infra part I.F., and various judges' 
opinions, see infra part I.H. Moreover, the absence of details about Randolph's 
argument indicates Call did not have access to Randolph's notes. 
56 Scholars have sharply disagreed among themselves as to which members of the 
Federal Constitutional Convention endorsed judicial review. Taking a conservative 
approach, Levy counts six participants as advocates of judicial review. Randolph is 
one of the six. See LEVY, supra note 4, at 103. 
57 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 14, at 28. 
In addition, with respect to the proposal that Congress has the power to block state 
laws, Randolph suggested, as an accommodation to the small states, that states have 
the right to appeal congressional decisions to the national judiciary, which would have 
the power to hold congressional negatives "void." 3 id. at 56. 
58 9 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
1101 Gohn P. Kaminiski & Gasparej. Saladino eds., 1990) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY 
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In the notes, after stating the facts of the case, Randolph began 
his legal argument by attempting to show that the statute and the 
constitution were not in conflict. He started by articulating his 
premise that the rules appropriate for construing a constitution 
were different from those appropriate for construing a statute. "In 
the former," he wrote: 
the liberality, necessary to catch its spirit, must be adopted. 
In the latter, the masculine force of substantial sense is too 
often subjected to the petty tyranny of grammatical rule. 
The cause of this distinction seems to be, that 
l. the constitution describes general outlines only; whereas a law 
proposes the detail ... [crossed out material] 
In a word, the constitution cannot avoid a generality of terms, lest 
it should omit a part of that infinity of combination, of which the 
affairs of society are capable-whereas a law touches single subjects 
only.59 
Randolph then sought to show that the constitution-interpreted 
in accordance with the "principle of liberality"60-did not bar the 
Senate from participating in the pardoning process. Commenting 
on the fact that the constitution specifically provided the House of 
Delegates with the power to pardon in cases of impeachment, 
Randolph wrote, "[E]very argument which tends to the propriety of 
uniting [the Senate] in pardoning in these instances [of impeach-
ments], will prove the great improbability of their exclusion being 
intended in any other."61 Randolph thus specifically invoked 
framers' intent. But, as his argument made clear, he was not 
appealing to any specific evidence of subjective intent. Rather, 
intent was to be determined by looking at the structure of govern-
ment established by the constitution, the nature of the governmen-
HISTORY]. It should be added that, if Randolph, in the part of the notes that has not 
survived, did declare his opposition to judicial review, this Article's contention that 
judicial review won early acceptance in Virginia would not be undermined. That 
acceptance is amply evidenced by the fact that the decision in the Case of the Prisoners 
did not provoke controversy, that all the speakers in the state constitutional 
convention to take a position on judicial review were in favor of it, and by early state 
case law. See infra part I.I, II.B. That the Attorney General announced his support 
for judicial review in a case in which he was also urging that a statute be upheld 
simply highlights the larger phenomenon. 
09 Randolph, supra note 8, at 3. As will be discussed below, Randolph originally 
listed three points under this heading. He then crossed out the second and third. 
See infra text accompanying notes 75-76. 
60 Randolph, supra note 8, at 4. 
61 ld. 
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tal institutions implicated, and by what common sense would 
indicate the framers intended. 
In advancing his argument, Randolph first attempted to show 
why, under the British Constitution, it was proper to deny the King 
the power to pardon in cases of impeachment. He sketched the 
monarch's broad powers, and then stated, "As often as this 
formidable being shall offend against his country, his servants are 
considered as his wicked advisers and must suffer. Were he then 
permitted to cast a shield over them in defiance of the prosecution 
of the people, their security against his tyranny would be greatly 
diminished. "62 
In contrast, Randolph saw no reason to bar the Virginia Senate 
from a role in granting pardons in cases of impeachment. He 
asked, "[I]s a Virginian Senate armed with these fangs or these 
horrors [which the King possessed]? Have they separate interests 
from the Delegates?"63 He answered by noting that membership 
in the Senate was not hereditary, that the senators were elected by 
the people, that they could not originate bills or amend money bills, 
and that the senators were not "by their powers as much of 
aristocracy as would hang on an aspin [sic]leaf."64 He also noted 
that under the constitution the senators were clearly incapable of 
issuing pardons without the approval of the House of Delegates. 
Randolph concluded that "[i]n the eyes of political wisdom," the 
House of Delegates had no grounds to fear a Senate role in the 
pardoning power in cases of impeachment. 55 
If there was no reason to deny the Senate a role in pardoning in 
cases of impeachment, Randolph stated that "[s]till less is to be 
apprehended from their interference in other cases."66 He did not 
develop this point at length, but simply argued that there was no 
reason why the case of treason was so unique that the Senate should 
not have a role in pardoning those convicted of it: "[Treason] 
strikes as deep into the happiness of the Senate as citizens, and 
their existence as a body. Their judgment will be as keen, and 
irritation vs. the offense as acute [as that of the House of Dele-
gates]."67 
62 !d. at 5. 
63 !d. Randolph originally wrote: "Have they separate interests from the people?" 
He then crossed out "people" and wrote in "Delegates." 
64 !d. 
65 !d. 
66 !d. at 6. 
67 !d. 
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"These considerations," Randolph wrote, "are designed to open 
the way for reconciling by construction the law with the constitu-
tion. For if [the constitution's] spirit opposes the exclusion of the 
Senate, its words must be free from ambiguity and decided, or 
cannot have the supremacy. "68 In other words, Randolph believed 
that the constitution should be construed in light of the political 
philosophy underlying the document. When a statute was chal-
lenged on constitutional grounds, and the statute was consistent 
with the philosophy of the constitution, the statute was constitution-
al unless contrary to express and unambiguous constitutional 
dictates. 
Randolph then proposed a series of ways in which the court 
could interpret the constitution so as to find the statute valid. The 
first "solution" he offered was that the court should treat the phrase 
"or the law shall otherwise particularly direct" in the pardon clause 
of the constitution as if it were in parentheses.69 Thus, the 
constitution would provide that, in the case of prosecutions 
conducted by the House of Delegates, only the House of Delegates 
could issue pardons. In the case of other prosecutions, the 
legislature could provide any method of pardoning that it de-
sired. 70 
"Perhaps a better interpretation," Randolph continued, was 
reading the constitutional clause to hold that the House of Dele-
gates had to assent to a pardon, but not as holding it to bar the 
additional requirement that the Senate had to concur with the 
House. 71 Finally, Randolph suggested that the Treason Act 
represented a determination by the House of Delegates that it 
wanted the Senate to participate in the pardoning process. The 
statute, rather than being a derogation from the power of the House 
of Delegates, merely embodied that body's decision as to how it 
wanted to exercise its pardoning power under the constitution. 
Randolph asked: 
[S]hall the delegates be forbidden to call in assistance the 
judgment of the Senate? And if they have declared, that the 
pardon of treason is too important for their decision, what injury 
68 /d. 
69 /d. at 7. 
70 See id. 
71 /d. 
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can arise from their admitting the Senate so far, as to say, that 
they will not pardon without their concurrence?72 
511 
Randolph then turned to the "two awful contemplations" that 
the court would be forced to consider if it rejected his contention 
that the statute and the constitution could be reconciled: "1. Is the 
treason law to be declared void, so far as it is repugnant to the 
constitution? 2. If it can be declared void, can any court of 
judicature pronounce its nullity?" 73 
Randolph had seemingly already stated his position on these 
questions. At the start of his notes, in setting forth the position of 
the state in the case, Randolph asserted, "[I]n the volume of the law 
... we believe to be written ... that, howsoever adverse the law 
which vests this [pardoning] power in the general assembly may be 
to the constitution, no court of judicature can pronounce its 
nullity. "74 
Moreover, in comparing constitutions and statutes at the 
beginning of his notes, Randolph originally wrote that "the 
constitution is intended, as a rule for the governors-a law for the 
rule of the governed. "75 He also wrote that "the constitution 
delegates to the legislature every power of the people, except that 
of opposition-a law only draws into action certain portions of that 
power. "76 Both points suggest that the function of the constitution 
is merely hortatory, as far as the legislature is concerned, and that 
the constitution imposes no constraints on a legislature that wishes 
to disregard constitutional dictates. Thus, the legislature possesses 
"every power of the people," and the constitution is a "law" for the 
people, but merely a "rule" for the legislature. The only powers 
that the people retain are those of "opposition," presumably the 
powers to vote the legislature out or to revolt. This position 
paralleled Blackstone's view of parliamentary supremacy: the 
72 /d. at 8. 
73 /d. The first question, from its context, poses the question whether judicial 
review is legitimate. The logical subject of "declared" in the first question is the 
court, because it is the court that is to answer the question, "Is the treason law to be 
declared void, so far as it is repugnant to the constitution?" Randolph's second 
question appears to pose the jurisdictional issue raised in the case, which is not 
resolved in the part of the notes that survives. In other words, "If it can be declared 
void, can any court of judicature pronounce its nullity?" poses the question whether 
the general court alone can nullify a criminal statute or whether the court of appeals 
possesses that power as well. 
74 /d. at 2. 
"/d. at 3. 
76 /d. 
512 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143: 491 
Virginia legislature, like the parliament, is the supreme law-giver. 77 
At some point, however, Randolph apparently decided to reject 
this position. In revising the draft, he lined out the two distinctions 
between statutes and the constitution just discussed. And, after he 
demonstrated that the legislation and the constitution were not 
inconsistent, he declared himself in favor of judicial review. It is 
unclear whether, as he began drafting his notes, Randolph originally 
intended to argue against judicial review. But as he eventually set 
forth his ideas on judicial review, he made clear that his position 
was not the position of the Commonwealth. In stating his initial 
rejection of judicial review, Randolph used the word "we." In 
setting forth his arguments in favor of judicial review, however, he 
carefully ascribed the position to himself.78 
Randolph declared himself in favor of judicial review in a 
fashion that was both dramatic and that conveyed the difficulty that 
he felt in adopting this position. After having informed the court 
that, if it found the statute and constitution inconsistent, it would 
have to resolve the difficult questions whether a statute inconsistent 
with the constitution was void and whether any court had the power 
to so find, Randolph said: 
Here let me pause. 
But why pause? 
Do I tremble at the decision of my own mind, that a law 
against the constitution may be declared void? or I [sic] do I 
dread the resentment of the court, when I bear testimony against 
their competency to pronounce the invalidity of the law? 
No! The revolution has given me a coat of mail for my 
defense, while I adhere to its principles. That bench too is reared 
on the revolution, and will arrogate no undue power. 
I hold then, that every law against the constitution may be 
declared void.79 
He told the court that his sense of duty led him to argue as he did. 
"On this head," he wrote, "you [are] perceiving that [I] argue in 
77 Blackstone maintained that "the supreme and absolute authority of the state ... 
is vested by our constitution" in Parliament. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
147 (Edward Christian ed., Thomas B. Wait & Co. 1807) (1765). For a more 
complete discussion of Blackstone's view of parliamentary supremacy, see generally 
id. at 145-89 (chapter on parliament and its powers). 
78 See Randolph, supra note 8, at 9-11 (making reference to "I" and "me" when 
discussing judicial review). 
79 ld. at 9. 
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favor of the criminals: my office does not extinguish that respect, 
which I shall owe to the constitution, as long as it remains such. "80 
Randolph then expounded upon the significance of a constitu-
tion and what a constitution was. "Take a people," he began, "who 
have either never yet entered into a formal social compact, or 
having abolished an old one are about to conclude another." 81 
Such a people would have differing ideas of how government should 
be structured and what their role in it was to be. One faction would 
desire "the uncontrouled command of an emperor."82 Another 
faction, "equally outrageous in their thirst for unlimited sovereignty, 
but conscious of their own individual capacity to govern, will form 
one common phalanx, and cry aloud for aristocracy," while some of 
this group "fancying themselves formed of purer clay, and enjoying 
a higher portion of aetherial spirit, than their companions, may rise 
to the claim of oligarchy."83 A third faction would seek "fair 
equality" and "the boisterous ocean of plebian rule," while a fourth 
faction, "more moderate-demonstrably more wise," would "labour 
for the erection of a system, sharing the good, and shunning the 
vices of the others. "84 
Randolph asked the court to imagine a legislature composed of 
members of these various factions: 
[H]ow could laws, whose object is public happiness, be enacted 
subservient to this end, without a touchstone, by which to 
ascertain the degree of restraint or countenance, which may be 
given to each of the simple forms of government[?] 
Without [a constitution] it cannot be decided how far the 
people, the fountain of power, have chosen to deposit it in the 
hands of their legislative servants, nor determine, when the right 
of resistance commences.85 
To avoid legislative abuse of power and to avoid chaos, a 
constitution was necessary. Randolph defined a constitution as 
[a] compact, in which the people themselves are the sole parties 
and which they alone can abrogate, delineating the degree, to 
which they have parted with legislative, executive and judiciary 
80 !d. at 11. 
81 !d. at 9. 
82 !d. at 10. 
83 !d. 
84 !d. 
85 !d. at 10-11. 
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power, as well as prescribing how far each of the simple forms of 
government is to be pursued in acts of legislation.86 
Randolph's notes end abruptly as he turned to rebut a Black-
stonian conception of legislative supremacy. They conclude: "That 
we have a constitution in my sense of the word, will not, I presume, 
be controverted-But an objection has been made against the 
permanency of a constitution from the changes, which laws have 
made in European governments, and especially in England. "87 The 
remainder of his notes has apparently not been preserved. 
D. Analysis of Randolph's Argument 
In light of then-reigning legal and political orthodoxies, 
Randolph's notes are a remarkable document in several respects (in 
addition to his use of original intent, which has already been noted 
and will be discussed in greater detail later). Most important, they 
very clearly set forth a vision of a constitution as an agreement 
among the people-a social compact. The classic English Whig 
conception of a constitution was the very different notion of an 
agreement between ruler and ruled. This Whig notion informed the 
rhetoric of the Revolution-the King, it was maintained, had violated 
his agreement with his people.88 This notion also informed 
constitution-making at the start of the revolutionary era. As 
Gordon Wood has written, the state constitutions "were still 
identified in the minds of many with their old colonial charters, as 
contracts between magistrates and people, defining and delimiting 
the powers and rights of each. "89 
By the time the Federal Constitution was ratified, the social 
compact conception of constitutions had displaced the notion of 
constitution as compact between ruled and ruler. Government had 
become a creature of the compact, rather than a party to it. 90 This 
new conception, in turn, provided a basis for judicial review. Thus, 
on the eve of the constitutional convention, James Iredell argued 
that judicial review was proper because judges were merely ensuring 
that the legislature did not exceed the limits of the delegation of 
power that it had received from the people. 91 Both Alexander 
86 /d. at 11. 
87 /d. 
88 See WOOD, supra note 4, at 268-70. 
89 /d. at 271. 
90 See id. at 600-01 (tracing the evolution of compact theory). 
91 See James Iredell, To the Public (1786), in 2 GRIFFITH j. MCREE, LIFE AND 
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Hamilton's Federalist No. 7892 and James Wilson's Lectures on Law, 93 
as well as Marbury, 94 defend judicial review in similar fashion. 
Randolph's notes suggest that he had come to a similar position 
earlier. Clearly, he thought of a constitution as a compact among 
the people-he explicitly stated as such in his definition of a consti-
tution. Moreover, this conception of a constitution seems to have 
been underlying his position that "a law against the constitution may 
be declared void. "95 A constitution is a "touchstone"; the constitu-
tion allows the determination of "how far the people, the fountain 
of power, have chosen to deposit it in the hands of their legislative 
servants. "96 Randolph seems to be moving toward the position 
that courts can review legislation for constitutionality because such 
review, rather than representing an aggrandizement of power by the 
judiciary, merely involves judicial enforcement of the boundaries 
created by the people when they adopted the constitution. 
Like the notes of his argument, the letter that Randolph sent 
Madison along with his notes also bears witness to this notion of the 
constitution as a compact among the people that the legislature 
cannot legitimately violate. In that letter, Randolph took issue with 
CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 145, 145-46 (1857) (noting that the power of the 
legislature is constrained by the Constitution); Letter from James Iredell to Richard 
Spaight (Aug. 26, 1787), in 2 McREE, supra, at 172 (elaborating on his theory of 
judicial review). 
92 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 464,467-68 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961). Hamilton noted: 
/d. 
There is no position which depends on clearer principles than that every act 
of a delegated authority, contrary to the teilor of the commission under 
which it is exercised, is void .... [W]henever a particular statute contravenes 
the Constitution, it will be the duty of the judicial tribunals to adhere to the 
latter and disregard the former. 
93 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 329-30 (Robert McCloskey ed., 1967). Wilson 
noted: 
/d. 
In consequence of[the Constitution], the bounds of the legislative power-a 
power most apt to overleap its bounds-are not only distinctly marked in a 
system itself; but effectual and permanent provision is made, that every 
transgression of those bounds shall be adjudged and rendered vain and 
fruitless. 
9
' 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175-80 (1803) ("If then the courts are to regard the 
constitution; and the constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature; the 
constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both 
apply."). 
95 Randolph, supra note 8, at 9. 
96 /d. at 11. 
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Jefferson's conception of the Virginia Constitution, a conception 
apparently enunciated in a memorandum to the Marquis de Barbe-
Marbois, a summary of which Randolph had received. Jefferson 
would later develop this conception in his Notes on the State of 
Virginia. 97 Jefferson argued that the convention that framed the 
Virginia Constitution was elected at the start of the Revolutionary 
War for the sole purpose of governing the state; the people had not 
vested that convention with the power to enact a constitution, and 
future legislatures were therefore under no obligation to comply 
with the constitution that the convention enacted. Thus, Jefferson 
argued, statutes could legitimately contravene constitutional pro-
visions. In addition, Jefferson pointed out that in the revolutionary 
era legislative transgressions on constitutional dictates were not only 
legitimate, they were frequent in occurrence.98 Rejecting these 
positions, Randolph wrote: 
Mr. J-n has truly stated the modes, in which the Constitution 
was formed. But he ought to have added, that the people 
expected at the time of the election of the convention, that they 
were to be vested with power, of every sort, necessary for political 
happiness altho' perhaps independence was not a reigning 
opinion; that they confirmed it by executing it: and that the 
incroachments, made on it by the assembly, have proceeded either 
from inadvertency, or emergencies. For it is notorious that they 
constantly profess a sacred regard to the constitution.99 
At the same time, Randolph did not suggest that the exercise of 
judicial review was a mechanical operation. In presenting his 
arguments to the court about the construction of the constitution's 
provision of pardoning, Randolph effectively acknowledged that the 
reading he was urging was not the only permissible one. He made 
clear that an ambiguous constitutional provision should be con-
strued in light of the principles underlying the document as a whole 
and in recognition of the importance of giving effect to legislative 
pronouncements. Thus, he declared, "For if [the constitution's] 
97 Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia ( 1787), reprinted in THOMAS 
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 123 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984). 
98 See Hutchinson & Rachal, supra note 8, at 320 n.7 (noting that "[d]uring the 
Revolution, the Virginia General Assembly had frequently transgressed [the 
constitution] and legally could have rescinded it altogether"); Jefferson, supra note 97, 
at 246-51 (adhering to the view that the Constitution could be altered by acts of the 
legislature). 
99 Letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison (Mar. 7, 1783), in 6 MADISON 
PAPERS, supra note 8, at 318, 319. 
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spirit opposes the exclusion of the Senate, its words must be free 
from ambiguity and decided, or cannot have the supremacy."100 
Such a statement reflects a conception of judicial review 
involving a marked degree of deference to the legislature. But 
Randolph's conception of judicial review was even more deferential 
than such a statement suggests, since the "ambiguity" in the 
constitution's pardoning provision was largely Randolph's handi-
work. The constitutional clause seems to provide that where the 
executive was stripped of the pardoning power, the House of 
Delegates alone would have the power to pardon. Randolph created 
ambiguity by offering a number of strained readings of the 
constitutional text. As he privately admitted in one of his letters to 
Madison concerning the case, "I doubt not, that to any but lawyers 
the construction, by which the two [statute and constitutional 
provisions] were reconcile[ d,] would appear unix·,telligible." 101 
It may also be significant that Randolph decided not to be fully 
candid about the extent of deference that he thought appropriate 
in this case. In other words, he did not tell the court that he 
believed that a statute should be upheld if there were any reading 
of the constitution-no matter how strained and unintelligible to the 
layman-that would sustain it. This suggests that Randolph believed 
that it was important that statements of the principle of judicial 
review should not be too weak. Randolph appears to have thought 
for prudential reasons that the court should not overturn the 
Treason Act. Thus, when the decision was handed down, he wrote 
Madison that the court had avoided a determination whether a law 
could be declared void and that "[t]here surely was prudence in the 
path, which they took." 102 But he also apparently believed that the 
legislature should not be granted teo wide a latitude, and that it was 
important not to acknowledge the extent to which prudential 
concerns would lead courts to uphold legislative actions inconsistent 
with constitutional provisions. 
As they did with respect to the idea of a constitution, 
Randolph's notes indicate that he had moved away from the domi-
nant modes of thought at the outbreak of the Revolution with 
100 Randolph, supra note 8, at 6. 
101 Letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison (Nov. 8, 1782), in 5 MADISON 
PAPERS, supra note 8, at 262, 263. Randolph was referring to the court's decision, but 
since the court adopted his reading, the comment is equally applicable to Randolph's 
own argument. 
102 !d. 
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respect to faith in legislatures. At the start of the Revolution, 
Republican thinkers had believed that the legislature would be 
uniquely able to perceive and then advance the common good. 103 
Randolph's picture of the legislature is markedly different. For 
Randolph, in the absence of a constitution, the legislature would be 
comprised of advocates of tyranny, aristocratic rule, and mob rule; 
those who discern the common good and seek to take from various 
systems a new system "sharing the good, and shunning the vices of 
the others" are but one group among many. 104 Governance by 
such a legislature would produce chaos and each undesirable system 
of government would leave its stamp on the polity: "[C]ivil 
institutions might be directed at different periods of the day to the 
support of the different principles of government . . . . This would 
leave a great multitude constantly murmuring and this mixture 
would give a truly pantomime govt to a code of laws." 105 
Randolph never stated that the actual Virginia legislature was 
subject to the same weaknesses as his hypothetical legislature, but 
his meaning was clear: unless subject to constitutional checks, a 
state legislature would combine all the flaws that could characterize 
a government not subject to the checks imposed by balanced 
government. It would be, by turns, characterized by the worst 
aspects of mob rule, tyranny, and oligarchy, and would evidence a 
lack of stability. 
In contrast, the bench was, in Randolph's view, dispassionate, 
above the fray, and able to act in accordance with the most valued 
principles of republican government. Thus, he stated, "the revolu-
tion has given me a coat of mail for my defense, while I adhere to 
its principles. That bench too is reared on the revolution, and will 
arrogate no undue power." 106 
Randolph's acceptance of judicial review was thus based in 
significant part on his rejection of notions of institutional capacity 
that had animated the revolutionaries of 1776. They had placed 
their faith in the legislature as a body capable of articulating and 
defending republican values, while denigrating the judiciary as 
10
' See WOOD, supra note 4, at 162-73 (discussing early perceptions of representa· 
tive legislatures); William M. Treanor, Note, The 01·igins and Original Significance of 
the just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE LJ 694, 701-02 ( 1985) 
(asserting that "[a]s the voice of the people, the legislature could be trusted to 
perceive the common good and to define the limits of individual rights"). 
104 Randolph, supra note 8, at 10. 
105 ld. at 11. 
106 ld. at 9. 
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subject to the same antipopular tendencies as the executive. 
Randolph, in contrast, feared the legislature and placed his faith in 
the judiciary's adherence to revolutionary principles; this view is 
reflected in his embrace of judicial review. His willingness to 
concede the legitimacy in principle of judicial review in a case in 
which he was arguing to uphold a statute suggests a point that will 
be subsequently developed-judicial review early won surprisingly 
broad acceptance in Virginia. 
E. Argument for the Prisoners 
Andrew Ronald appeared on behalf of Caton, Lamb, and 
Hopkins. 107 Ronald contended that the meaning of the constitu-
tion was clear: "[T]he power of pardoning belonged to the house 
of delegates. "108 He urged the court to reject Randolph's claim 
that the constitution's pardoning clause should be construed in light 
of framers' intent: "[T]he words of the constitution, and not conjec-
tures drawn from the supposed meaning of the framers of it, should 
give the rule. "109 According to Ronald, judicial review of statutes 
was not only a proper judicial function, it compelled rejection of the 
treason statute. "[T]he act of assembly was contrary to the plain 
declaration of the constitution; and therefore void." 110 Ronald 
also argued that to the extent that the constitution was ambiguous, 
"the construction ought, in favour of life, to incline to the side of 
mercy." 111 
In addition, Ronald offered the court a way to resolve the case 
in favor of his clients without determining whether the exercise of 
judicial review was legitimate. He contended that the constitution's 
pardoning provision and the statutory pardoning provision were not 
inconsistent: both provisions made a separate grant of the pardon-
ing power. Thus, the constitution gave the House of Delegates the 
power to pardon independently, while the treason statute gave the 
two houses of the legislature the power to pardon jointly. A par-
107 In his reports, Call states that the cause of the prisoners was argued by "Mr. 
Hardy and several other distinguished gentlemen." Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. 
( 4 Call) 5, 6 (1782). Mays speculates that the Mr. Hardy referred to was Samuel 
Hardy, a young Virginia lawyer. See 2 MAYS, supra note 6, at 194. Pendleton's notes 
state that Ronald was counsel for the prisoners. See Pendleton, supra note 6, at 417. 
108 Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) at 7. 
109 !d. 
110 !d. 
Ill Jd. 
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don granted in either fashion was valid. He analogized the case to 
a situation in which a right could be conferred by common law or 
by statute. The prisoners should have been released because they 
had secured a pardon in one of the two ways in which a pardon 
could be issued. 112 
F. Amicus Advocates 
In addition to the representatives of the parties, the court heard 
from three men who responded to Pendleton's call for argument 
from interested members of the Virginia Bar: John Francis Mercer, 
brother of Judge James Mercer and a future member of Maryland's 
delegation to the Constitutional Convention; 113 William Nelson, 
who later became a judge of the Virginia General Court and a 
professor of law at William and Mary; 114 and the man who would 
eventually achieve the greatest eminence of the three, St. George 
Tucker. Tucker would become a member of the Virginia General 
Court, and then the court of appeals, a federal district court judge, 
and professor of law at William and Mary (where he was Wythe's 
successor and Nelson's predecessor). 115 Most important, he was 
the editor and author of Blackstone's Commentaries: With Notes of 
Reference to the Constitution and Laws of the Federal Government of the 
United States; and of the Commonwealth of Virginia. 116 This work 
included not only Tucker's notes on Blackstone's work, but lengthy 
appendices that he wrote on federal and state law. Charles Cullen, 
Tucker's biographer, has written: 
Until the introduction of the case method of teaching law in the 
late nineteenth century commentaries and treatises were actually 
the only texts or references students and lawyers had for studying 
American law, and St. George Tucker's Blackstone was the only 
summary of similar dimensions available until Chancellor James 
Kent of New York began publishing his Commentaries on Ame1·ican 
112 See Pendleton, supra note 6, at 418. 
113 See BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS, 1774-1989, 
S. Doc. No. 34, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1490-91 (1989). 
114 See Carrington, supra note 11, at 540-41. 
115 See CULLEN, supra note 8, at 188-89. Cullen's biography is the most detailed 
scholarly study of Tucker's career, although it ends with his appointment to the 
Virginia Court of Appeals. See generally MARY COLEMAN, ST. GEORGE TUCKER: 
CITIZEN OF No MEAN CITY (1938) (biography focusing on Tucker's personal life). 
116 See TUCKER, supra note 1. 
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Law in 1826. No other American edition of Blackstone could 
compare with Tucker's until 1852 .... 117 
521 
Until the appearance of Kent's Commentaries, Tucker was the 
commentator most frequently cited by the Supreme Court and the 
counsel who appeared before it. 118 He became known as the 
"American Blackstone." 119 
Call indicates that all the lawyers who appeared as amici argued 
on behalf of the prisoners. 120 Pendleton states that these lawyers 
"differ(ed] amongst themselves in several points, particularly as to 
the Power of the Court to declare an Act of Assembly void in any 
case. "121 It appears that Nelson and Tucker, at least, both argued 
in favor of judicial review. Apart from the brief summaries in Call's 
and Pendleton's accounts, the only apparent surviving record of any 
of the amici's arguments is Tucker's notes. Tucker's notes, which 
will be discussed below, make clear that he argued in favor of the 
prisoners and in favor of judicial review. The notes are in the form 
of a letter "To W. N. Esq." and Tucker indicated in the margin that 
they were originally prepared as an argument to be read by "my 
friend Wm. Nelson who proposed to appear in behalf of the 
prisoners. "122 Apparently, when Tucker arrived in Court, he 
found that Nelson had already drafted his own comments. Nelson 
suggested that Tucker deliver his own remarks, and the latter 
did. 123 Presumably, then, Tucker and Nelson were in essential 
agreement on the positions that they took. Mercer, in contrast, 
likely argued against judicial review since, when he attended the 
Federal Constitutional Convention as a Maryland representative, he 
stated that "(h]e disapproved of the Doctrine that the Judges as 
expositors of the Constitution should have authority to declare a law 
void. He thought laws ought to be well and cautiously made, and 
then to be uncontroulable." 124 
1!7 CULLEN, mpra note 8, at 162. 
118 See id. at 163 & n.77 (noting that Tucker's Blackstone was cited 19 times in 
opinions and arguments by counsel). 
119 J. Randolph Tucker, The judges Tucker of the Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1 VA. 
L. REG. 789, 793 ( 1896). 
120 See Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5, 5 (1782). 
121 Pendleton, supra note 6, at 418. 
122 Tucker, supra note 8. This comment is on the jacket of the notes. 
12
' See id. 
124 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 14, at 298. 
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G. Tucker's Argument 
Tucker's notes are, with Randolph's, apparently the oldest 
surviving revolutionary-era document discussing judicial review, and 
the complexity and detail of the analysis make Tucker's notes of 
particular value as an historical document. Unlike Randolph's, 
Tucker's argument is fully preserved. Also unlike Randolph, Tucker 
did not advance a conception of judicial review that reflected 
judicial deference to the legislature. Tucker's argument merits 
recognition as being of intellectual force equal to the famous 
defenses of judicial review that James Iredell, 125 Alexander Hamil-
ton, 126 and James Wilson 127 were subsequently to develop. The 
two aspects of his argument that merit particular scrutiny are his 
justification for judicial review and his conception of constitutional 
construction. 
Tucker began by invoking the provision of the Virginia Bill of 
Rights under which "the Executive and Legislative powers of the 
state should be separate and distinct from the Judiciary" and the 
parallel provision of the state constitution barring each branch from 
exercising the powers of another. 128 The relevant question thus 
became what the judicial function was. Tucker did not, however, 
treat this subject as one over which people could differ. "Now I 
hold it to be uncontrovertible," he said, "that the power properly 
belonging to the Judiciary Department, is, to explain the Laws of 
the Land as they apply to particular cases. "129 That this power of 
applying the laws to specific cases was vested exclusively in the 
judiciary was a necessary restraint on legislative tyranny. He 
invoked Montesquieu for the proposition that "the same Man or 
body of men should not enact Laws, or afterwards carry them into 
execution, for in this case [Montesquieu] observes arbitrary Laws 
may first be made and then tyrannically executed, or interpret-
ed. "130 "[T]his," Tucker added, "is also the spirit of our Constitu-
125 See Iredell, supra note 91; Letter from james Iredell to Richard Spaight (Aug. 
26, 1787), in 2 MCREE, supra note 91, at 172. 
126 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 92. 
127 See 1 THE WORKS OF jAMES WILSON, supra note 93, at 329-30. Wilson lectured 
that it is tbe right and duty of a court of justice to void any legislative act repugnant 
to the constitution. 
128 Tucker, supra note 8, at 2-3. 
129 /d. at 3. 
1
'
0 /d. at 4. 
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tion .... [T]he Judiciary ... are by the Constitution appointed as a 
counterpoise to [the legislature]." 131 
Having developed the proposition that application of the law to 
individual cases was an exclusively judicial function, Tucker asserted 
"it follows that [the judiciary] alone (if any of the Departments of 
Government can do it) can decide what is or is not Law, and 
consequently (I should presume) on the validity or nullity of 
different Laws contradicting each other." 132 When the conflict 
was between a statute and the constitution, the constitution had 
precedence because it was the "Bulwark of the Liberties of the 
Citizens of this Commonwealth ... as framed agreeable to their Bill 
of Rights which is declared to be the Basis and Foundation of 
Government." 133 Tucker continued: 
Under this Idea I conceive the Constitution not Iyable to any 
alteration whatsoever by the Legislative, without destroying that 
Basis and Foundation of Government. 
For altho' it be true that the Judges are sworn to decide in all 
matters brought before them agreeably to the Laws of the Land, 
yet as the Constitution (is] the first Law by which they are bound, 
and any Decision contrary thereto is absolutely subversive of that 
Government of which it is undoubtedly the Basis and Founda-
tion. 134 
This part of his argument for judicial review is based on a 
separation of powers theory. Judicial review is justified as simply an 
exercise of the judicial function of deciding what law to apply to a 
particular case. In other words, when the constitution and a statute 
dictate different results in a case, the court must choose between 
them, and its first obligation is to the constitution. 
Significantly, this separation of powers argument has two 
different and independent bases. One is Montesquieu, and the 
other is the state constitution. Tucker invokes Montesquieu as 
standing for the general proposition that it invites tyranny to have 
the lawmaker also be the law interpreter. 135 The most important 
lSI ld. 
m ld. at 5. 
m ld. at 6. 
IS< Jd. 
m Tucker did not cite a specific section of Montesquieu, but his reference is 
presumably to the chapter in The Spirit of the Laws on the English Constitution, the 
chapter that most profoundly influenced the Framers of the United States Constitu-
tion. See MJ.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 84-86 
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point to recognize about this argument is that it is extraconstitu-
tional: it indicates that judicial review would be appropriate even 
in the absence of constitutional text providing for separation of 
powers. 
The alternative separation of powers argument-the constitu-
tional argument-draws on very open-ended constitutional text. 
Tucker's reference to the Virginia Bill of Rights is a reference to 
section five, which states in relevant part: "That the Executive and 
Legislative powers of the state should be separate and distinct from 
the Judiciary. "136 Since the concept of the judiciary as a separate 
branch of government was relatively novel, 137 the term "Judiciary" 
did not have a fixed meaning. Tucker's statement, "This is also the 
Spirit of the Constitution, "138 implicitly recognizes this with its 
invocation of the "spirit," not the letter, of the constitution. 
Tucker acknowledged that Parliament was not constrained by 
the British Constitution, but stated, "[N]o parallel can possibly be 
drawn between the Constitution of [Great Britain] and this 
Country." 139 The Magna Carta, the Habeas Corpus Act, and the 
British Bill of Rights were all "constitutional acts," but they "have 
been altered by the British Parliament, more than once." 140 Such 
alteration reflected the fact that 
some of the ablest Politicians of that nation [Great Britain] 
considered [these statutes] only as Acts explanatory of that 
Constitution, which has existed to use their own phrase from times 
beyond the memory of man; and that all the Rights and Priviledges 
[sic] therein set forth were the inherent and indefeasible Rights of 
Englishmen equally as if those Acts explaining them had never 
been made. 141 
Under this view, since the constitutional acts were considered 
merely declaratory of the constitution, parliamentary amendment of 
( 1 967) (discussing Montesquieu 's chapter on the English Constitution and its effect 
on the evolution of the separation of powers doctrine). In that chapter-which is 
chapter 6 of part 2, book 11-Montesquieu wrote: "Nor is there liberty if the power 
of judging is not separate from legislative power. ... If it were joined to legislative 
power, the power over the life and liberty of the citizens would be arbitrary, for the 
judge would be the legislator." CHARLES DE SECONDAT MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF 
THE LAWS 157 (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds. & trans., 1989) (1748). 
lS6 VA. CONST. of 1776, art. I, § 5. 
137 See WOOD, supra note 4, at 159-60. 
158 See supra text accompanying note 131. 
159 Tucker, supra note 8, at 7. 
140 ld. 
141 Id. at 7. 
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them was seen as merely correcting previous misstatements about 
the meaning of the constitution. An alteration of one of the 
constitutional statutes "is only considered as placing what really was 
the Constitution in it's [sic] proper light." 112 Tucker added that 
the view that Parliament was not thereby altering the British 
Constitution was a "Fiction in Law," noting that "the British 
Constitution may be modelled agreeably to the will of Parliament, 
whose omnipotence in this Instance seems generally admitted. "143 
Tucker contrasted the Virginia Constitution with the British 
Constitution. The two were different in every critical aspect: 
[T]he British is constructive-Ours is express-the British is 
traditional; and different points of it have been explained at 
different times, and by different parliaments and in different 
modes. Ours on the contrary was framed with all the solemnity of 
an original Compact between the Citizens about to establish a 
Government most agreeable to themselves. That it might not be 
liable to be infringed it is founded on a Bill of Rights which is 
declared to form the Basis and Foundation of Government; and 
that it might not be misinterpreted it was committed to writing 
and made public to all the Citizens who became parties there-
to.I44 
The British Constitution evolves and is subject to judicial re-
interpretation. In contrast, the Virginia Constitution was for 
Tucker, as it was for Randolph, the original compact. For Tucker, 
one implication that followed from the Virginia Constitution's status 
as original compact was that its meaning was fixed. 
This stress on the constitution as original compact exists in 
tension with the Montesquieu-based argument for separation of 
powers. The former rests on the notion that the basis of law is 
positivist: law, and specifically constitutional law, is created by the 
people as they enact the original compact. To the extent that it is 
based, not on the constitution, but on the principle that it risks 
tyranny to have the lawmaker be the law-interpreter, the separation 
of powers argument indicates that there is a source of law external 
to the positivist constitution: judges are empowered to review 
statutes, not because the people have given them that power, but 
because they must do so if liberty is to be preserved. 
142 !d. at 8. 
H3 fd. 
144 !d. at 8-9. 
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Having offered his explanation of the nature of the Virginia 
Constitution, Tucker stated, without apparently feeling the need for 
elaboration or defense, that the judiciary was entrusted with the 
protection of the constitution: "Here then [in the constitution] are 
explained those Fundamental Principles of our Government, of 
which the Judiciary Department is constituted the Guardian." 145 
Tucker's language here is significant. His choice of the word 
"Guardian" suggests that protection of the constitution is a 
peculiarly judicial role, rather than a responsibility shared among 
the branches. 
The point that troubled Jefferson-the fact that the convention 
that enacted the Virginia Constitution had not been elected for that 
purpose-was not addressed by Tucker, but he did offer two 
explanations for why the legislature's acts were subject to constitu-
tional limits. First, since the legislature was the creature of the 
constitution, it logically did not have the authority to alter the 
document that called it into being: "For the Constitution being the 
Act of the political Legislature and in nature of an original Compact 
between the Citizens of the Commonwealth ... an inferior or 
subordinate Institution can not have power to annul or avoid any 
part of the Constitution so established. "146 Second, the people did 
not understand the legislature to have the power to act in a way that 
was inconsistent with the constitution: "[T]here is no proposition 
in nature more generally admitted, than the Opinion is received 
[sic] in this Commonwealth, that no General Assembly can alter, 
repeal or annul a single Iota of the Constitution." 147 As a result, 
any legislative act that was "repugnant" to the constitution was "ab 
initio void. "148 
After establishing that the constitution was superior to statutes 
and that the judiciary was the guardian of the constitution, Tucker 
turned to the question whether the Treason Act "be consistent with 
or repugnant to the Constitution. "149 He candidly informed the 
court, "Here my embarrassment is excessive on many Accounts-! 
145 /d. at 9. 
146 /d. at 9-10. 
147 /d. at 1 0; see also id. ("[T)he universal concurrence of Opinion in the Citizens 
of the Commonwealth [is that) Any General Assembly convened for the purposes of 
civil Legislation only [does not have) the right of altering, repealing or annulling the 
Constitution.~). 
148 /d. 
149 /d. at 11. 
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have never seen the Treason Law. "150 Earlier in his argument, 
Tucker had made clear that a statute would be unconstitutional only 
if it were dramatically at odds with the constitution, stating that the 
constitution "is the touchstone by which every Act of the Legislature 
is to be tried. If any Act thereof shall be found absolutely and 
irreconcilably contradictory to the Constitution, it can not admit of 
a Doubt that such act is absolutely null and void." 151 Tucker 
continued: 
I [am not] competent to decide so nice a point as that which this 
Question [of the statute's constitutionality] includes. Yet the 
reasons offered, as I am informed, by an honourable member of 
the G.C. that it was the Intention of the Constitution to have as 
few Obstacles as possible in the way to mercy-and some other 
parts of the constitution by which it appears that particular 
exclusive Privileges have been reserved to the honour of the house 
of Delegates-have induced me to incline to the Opinion that the 
spirit of our Constitution declares that the power of pardoning in 
all cases where it is not given to the Executive is vested in the 
House of Delegates alone. 152 
Tucker, in resolving a question of a statute's constitutionality, 
looked beyond the express limitations established by the constitu-
tional text. Just as he had invoked the "spirit" of the constitution 
in support of the notion of judicial review, now Tucker asserted that 
a statute could be unconstitutional because it was inconsistent with 
the "spirit" of the constitution. This broad notion of judicial review 
accords with Tucker's notion of the judiciary as the "Guardian" of 
the constitution. 
In locating the "spirit," Tucker looked beyond the constitutional 
text and considered contemporaneous testimony about intent as 
well as constitutional structure. Like Randolph, therefore, Tucker 
employed an argument from intent to support his position. But 
Randolph used intent to mean what logic and considerations of 
structure suggested that the framers intended. As Andrew Ronald, 
the attorney for the prisoners, accurately (if unsympathetically) 
summarized Randolph's approach, it involved "conjectures drawn 
from the supposed meaning of the framers." 153 Tucker, in con-
trast, cited specific extra-textual evidence of the framers' intent, 
150 /d. 
m /d. at 9. 
m /d. at 11. 
15
' Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5, 7 (1782). 
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intent meaning subjective intent. The "honourable member of the 
G.C. "154 presumably referred to one of the members of the 
General Convention that had framed the Virginia Constitution. 155 
This individual had some inside knowledge into why the constitu-
tion's pardoning clause was written as it was: "[I]t was the Intention 
of the Constitution to have as few Obstacles as possible in the way 
to mercy .... "156 Randolph derived intention by analyzing the 
document. Tucker, in contrast, is "informed" of it. He himself is 
not "competent to decide" the question of constitutionality. And by 
telling the court that he had been informed of the intent of the 
constitution, Tucker indicated that he believed the framers' 
subjective intent was relevant to judicial exegesis of the constitution, 
even though that intent was not apparent from the face of the 
constitutional document. 
Tucker argued that the Treason Act could not survive scrutiny 
by a court that understood the constitution's meaning. "[The 
statute] not only gives powers where the Constitution had tacitly 
denied them, but renders that [the pardoning power of the House 
of Delegates] incompleat and inadequate which the Constitution had 
declared fully sufficient. "157 Again, it is striking that Tucker's 
determination that the statute was unconstitutional is not based on 
an express conflict between statute and constitution; the statute is 
unconstitutional because it allocates a power to the Senate which 
the constitution had, as Tucker put it, "tacitly" denied. Tucker's 
conclusion made clear that he believed that his earlier statement 
that a statute had to be "irreconcilably" at odds with the constitu-
tion to be unconstitutional was consistent with the position that this 
statute was unconstitutional. "Here then I apprehend," Tucker 
stated, "we may trace an absolute Contradiction-For the Law 
declared that to be insufficient which the Constitution had before 
154 See supra text accompanying note 152. 
155 For another example of such a reference to the 1776 convention, see RALPH 
KETCHAM, jAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 68 (1971) (referring to the May 1776 
meeting of Virginia delegates at Williamsburg as the "General Convention"). 
Similarly, contemporaneous references to the Federal Constitutional Convention as 
the "General Convention" were standard. See, e.g., 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 14, at 545 Qames Madison); 4 id. at 83 (same); 2 
ANNALS OF CONG. 1360 (1790) (statement of Eldridge Gerry). Alternatively, "G.C." 
could, theoretically, have been an abbreviation for "Governor's Council" or "General 
Court," but since Tucker was referring to someone with special knowledge of the 
"Intention of the Constitution," it seems clear "G.C." denoted "General Convention." 
156 See supra text accompanying note 152. 
157 Tucker, supra note 8, at 12. 
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declared to be fully sufficient, competent and compleat." 158 In 
other words, there could be an "absolute Contradiction" between a 
statute and the constitution even when the statute did not run afoul 
of an express constitutional prohibition, but rather the "spirit" of 
the constitution. The Treason Act was unconstitutional even though 
the constitution did not explicitly bar the Senate from sharing in the 
pardoning power. It was unconstitutional because the framers had 
wanted pardoning to be easy. 
H. The Decision of the Virginia Court of Appeals 
On November 2, 1782, Randolph wrote Madison: 
The great constitutional question, which was mentioned in my last 
letter, as having been adjourned from the general court to the 
court of appeals, received a second solemn hearing on thursday. 
The Judges, impressed with the dignity of it, have taken time until 
this day, when it will be finally decided, if some collateral objec-
tions should not prevent the dicision [sic ].159 
When the court reconvened later that day, the eight judges 
delivered eight separate opinions, 160 and the three prisoners lost 
in their bid for freedom. 161 The rationale behind the result, 
however, as well as the exact vote, is a matter of dispute. 
Reporter Daniel Call records all eight judges as ruling against 
the prisoners. 162 According to Call, Chancellor Pendleton, adopt-
ing Randolph's statutory interpretation argument, concluded that 
the Treason Act was consistent with the constitution and reserved 
the issue whether a court could pronounce a statute invalid. 163 
The other seven judges each declared that the court could pro-
nounce a statute unconstitutional and void but, like Pendleton, 
accepted Randolph's statutory argument and decided that the 
statute was constitutional. 164 Thus, although the prisoners lost, 
158 ld. 
159 Letter from Edmund Randolph to james Madison (Nov. 2, 1782), in 5 MADISON 
PAPERS, supra note 8, at 230, 230. 
160 See 2 MAYS, supra note 6, at 196 (noting that each judge was ordered to prepare 
his own opinion); see also Pendleton, supra note 6, at 426-27 (summarizing the judges' 
opinions). 
161 See Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. ( 4 Call) 5, 20 ( 1782). 
162 See id. at 13, 20. 
163 See id. at 17-18. 
164 See id. at 20. 
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seven of the eight judges concluded that they had the power to 
overturn statutes, and the final judge did not reach the issue. 165 
Chancellor Pendleton's notes reflect a more complicated range 
of views. 166 They indicate that two of the eight judges ruled in 
favor of the prisoners. Justice James Mercer found that the court 
had jurisdiction in criminal cases, stated that the Treason Act was 
unconstitutional, and concluded that the pardon was therefore 
good. 167 Justice Bartholomew Dandridge did not reach the issue 
of the legitimacy of judicial review and he said he was "doubtful" as 
to whether the court had jurisdiction. 168 He stated that the statute 
and the constitution set up alternate means to pardon, the former 
by requiring the approval of both houses of the General Assembly, 
the latter requiring the approval only of the House of Delegates. 
The pardon of the three prisoners was a valid pardon under the 
constitution. 169 
Of the six judges who ruled against the prisoners, all upheld the 
Treason Act as constitutional. Only Justice Peter Lyons rejected 
judicial review; he was "[a]gainst the Power of the Court to declare 
an Act of the Legislature void." 170 Lyons, however, also concluded 
that the act was not "against the Constitution. "171 At the other 
end of the spectrum on the matter of judicial review, Chancellor 
Wythe " [ u ]rged several strong and sensible reasons of the nature of 
those used by Lord Abblington, to prove that an Anti-constitutional 
Act of the Legislature would be void; and if so, that this Court must 
in Judgment declare it so, or not decide according to the Law of the 
land. "172 He found, however, that the Treason Act was constitu-
tional and that the pardon by the House of Delegates was therefore 
invalid. 173 
According to Pendleton's notes, no judge other than Wythe and 
Mercer pronounced himself in favor of judicial review. Pendleton 
came the closest, reserving the issue but suggesting that a court had 
165 See id. at 7-21. 
166 See Pendleton, supra note 6, at 426-27 (summarizing the respective views of 
each judge). 
167 See id. 
168 /d. at 426. 
169 See id. at 426-27. 
170 /d. at 426. 
171 /d. at 427. Justice Lyons was also the only judge of the six to find that the 
court did not have jurisdiction. See id. at 426. 
172 /d. 
m See id. 
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the power to pronounce a statute unconstitutional. 174 Chancellor 
Blair and Justice Dandridge reserved the issue of whether a court 
had power to declare a statute unconstitutional without offering a 
hint as to how they would resolve the question if forced to do 
so. 175 Judge Cary and Chief Justice Carrington resolved the issue 
of constitutionality without mentioning the question of judicial 
review. 176 Even if one believes, as Professor Julius Goebel appar-
ently did in his analysis of the opinions, that the fact that Carring-
ton and Cary analyzed the statute and pronounced it constitutional 
suggests that they believed that courts had the power to review 
statutes for constitutionality, the Case of the Prisoners is still not a 
precedent for judicial review. 177 Only four of the eight judges 
would have supported judicial review (and only actually voted to 
invalidate the statute). Moreover, Randolph's November 8, 1782 
letter to Madison shows that he viewed the court as having left open 
the question of the legitimacy of judicial review. 178 
Pendleton's notes report only his opinion in any detail. "[M]y 
memory," he wrote, "will not allow me to do Justice to the reasoning 
of the other Judges, "179 and therefore he only recorded the results 
they reached. Pendleton's account is presumably more accurate 
than Call's, since it was contemporaneous. At the same time, it is 
not the case, as Crosskey suggests, 180 that Call was simply working 
from Pendleton's notes and altering them in order to strengthen his 
claim that Commonwealth v. Caton (as the reporter called it) 
was the first case in the United States, where the question relative 
to the nullity of an unconstitutional law was ever discussed before 
judicial tribunal [and which] ... fixed a precedent, whereon, a 
174 See id. at 422. 
175 See id. at 426. 
176 See id. 
177 Using Pendleton's notes, Julius Goebel, Jr., concluded that the Case of the 
Prisoners was a precedent for judicial review, stating, "Five decided explicitly or by 
inference that the Court of Appeals had the power to declare a law void for 
unconstitutionality." 1 GOEBEL, supra note 4, at 127. Goebel classified Lyons as 
denying this to be the case, and Dandridge and Blair as declining the question. See 
id. This leaves Cary, Carrington, and Pendleton as those in favor of judicial review. 
As will be discussed, however, Pendleton's notes indicate that he reserved the issue. 
See infra text accompanying notes 192-99. 
178 Letter from Edmund Randolph to james Madison (Nov. 8, 1782), in 5 MADISON 
PAPERS, supra note 8, at 262, 263 ("The judges of the court of appeals avoided a 
determination, whether a law, opposing the constitution, may be declared void, in 
their decision of Saturday last."). 
179 Pendleton, supra note 6, at 418. 
180 See 2 CROSSKEY, supra note 1, at 952, 960 (questioning Call's report). 
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general practice, which the people of this country think essential 
to their rights and liberty, has been established.181 
If Call had been working from Pendleton's notes, he presumably 
would have included all of the language in Pendleton's notes 
indicating that he was sympathetic to judicial review. Call did not 
do this. 182 It appears, instead, that Call was working from some 
other set or sets of notes of the court's opinions-perhaps a set of 
St. George Tucker's, since Call dedicated the volume containing this 
case to Tucker and acknowledged "the assistance [Tucker] kindly 
lent me, to complete the following work. " 183 Thus, where Call's 
account is consistent with, but more detailed than, Pendleton's-as 
is the case with his report of Wythe's opinion-Call's report is 
presumably accurate. 
The only two opinions for which either account offers any detail 
are Wythe's and Pendleton's. As previously noted, Pendleton's brief 
account of Wythe's ruling makes clear that Wythe adopted the 
position that an" Anti-constitutional Act of the Legislature would be 
void; and if so, that this Court must in Judgment declare it so. "181 
Call's report elaborates on Wythe's rationale. The argument for 
judicial review advanced by Wythe (as reported by Call) is a 
separation of powers argument. The judiciary is the neutral arbiter 
enforcing the boundaries established by the community through the 
constitution. The discussion below follows Call's more detailed 
account of Wythe's opinion. 
At the start of his opinion, Wythe stressed the importance of 
"discussions upon the respective rights of the sovereign and the 
subject; and, upon the powers which the different branches of 
government may exercise. For, by this means, tyranny has been 
181 8 Va. (1 Call) at 20-21. 
182 See, e.g., Pendleton, supra note 6, at 122 ("Like all other declared Powers each 
[branch of government] has its limits, the Legislative as well as the others, which if 
they Pass, it would seem their Act would be void, as well as that of an Attorney would 
be, which was not Warranted by his appointment."). There is no similarly strong 
language about a statute apparently being "void" in Call's report. 
183 8 Va. (4 Call) at v. If, however, Call worked from Tucker's notes of the 
decision, they do not appear to have been preserved. The file of Tucker's papers on 
the Case of the Prisoners at the Earl Gregg Swem Library is limited to his notes of his 
argument. 
In addition, Call apparently did not use Tucker's notes of his own argument. 
Call did not, in any case, mention what that argument was or, indeed, that Tucker 
had argued. Call merely observed that the prisoners' counsel "and several other 
distinguished gentlemen" argued on their behalf. Id. at 6. 
184 Pendleton, supra note 6, at 426; see supra note 172. 
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sapped, the departments kept him within their own spheres, the 
c1t1zens protected, and general liberty promoted. "185 He then 
celebrated judicial review as fulfilling the ends pursued by those 
discussions: 
[T]his beneficial result attains to higher perfection, when those, 
who hold the purse and the sword, differing as to the powers 
which each may exercise, the tribunals, who hold neither, are 
called upon to declare the law impartially between them. For thus 
the pretensions of each party are fairly examined, their respective 
powers ascertained, and the boundaries of authority peaceably 
established. 186 
In the critical paragraph of the opinion's treatment of judicial 
review, Wythe makes clear both that the issue in the case is whether 
the legislature has exceeded its constitutionally delegated powers 
and that the purpose of judicial review is to hold the other branches 
of government in check: 
I have heard of an english chancellor who said, and it was nobly 
said, that it was his duty to protect the rights of the subject, 
against the encroachments of the crown; and that he would do it, 
at every hazard. But if it was his duty to protect a solitary 
individual against the rapacity of the sovereign, surely, it is equally 
mine, to protect one branch of the legislature, and, consequently, 
the whole community, against the usurpations of the other: and, 
whenever the proper occasion occurs, I shall feel the duty; and, 
fearlessly, perform it. Whenever traitors shall be fairly convicted, 
by the verdict of their peers, before the competent tribunal, if one 
branch of the legislature, without the concurrence of the other, 
shall attempt to rescue the offenders from the sentence of the law, 
I shall not hesitate, sitting in this place, to say, to the general 
court, Fiat justitia, ruat coelum; and, to the usurping branch of the 
legislature, you attempt worse than a vain thing; for, although, you 
cannot succeed, you set an example, which may convulse society 
to its centre. Nay more if the whole legislature, an event to be 
deprecated, should attempt to overleap the bounds, prescribed to 
them by the people, I, in administering the public justice of the 
country, will meet the united powers, at my seat in this tribunal; 
and, pointing to the constitution, will say, to them, here is the 
limit of your authority; and, hither, shall you go, but no fur-
ther.Js7 
185 Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. ( 4 Call) 5, 7 ( 1782). 
186 /d. at 8. 
187 /d. at 13. 
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The way in which the argument is cast is illuminating. The 
hypothetical horrible envisioned by Wythe is not that one branch of 
the legislature is causing the execution of prisoners who are 
constitutionally entitled to their lives and freedom. Rather, it is that 
one branch of the legislature is "attempting to rescue the offenders 
from the sentence of the law." This underscores the fact that, for 
Wythe, this case was about separation of powers; it was not about 
any right that the prisoners might have had under the pardoning 
clause of the state constitution. 
Having announced his commitment to judicial review, Wythe 
then pronounced the statute constitutional, adopting the alternative 
readings of the constitution that Randolph had proposed (and had 
suggested to Madison were strained). 188 "This mode of consider-
ing the subject, obviates the objection made by the prisoners' 
counsel, relative to the constitutionality of the law concerning 
treason," he concluded, "for, according to the interpretation just 
discussed, there is nothing unconstitutional in it." 189 
Wythe's opinion, as reported by Call, implicitly advances a 
notion of judicial review in which legislative acts are void if they are 
inconsistent with a constitutional text. It should be added, however, 
that Pendleton's very brief account leaves open another possibility. 
The reference to "Lord Abblington" is suggestive. 190 Lord Abing-
don's 1777 Thoughts on the Letter of Edmund Burke to the Sheriffs of 
Bristol on Affairs in America argued that no duty of obedience existed 
to laws inconsistent with the constitution. 191 Thus, there is at least 
a possibility that the actual opinion delivered by Wythe reflected a 
notion of judicial review that was based on the older, English-based 
notion of constitutionality, rather than on a notion of a constitution 
as written law. Under the older view, the citizen had no obligation 
to obey the unconstitutional statute because that statute violated the 
compact between governed and governors; disobedience was 
justified, but it was also tantamount to an act of rebellion. In 
contrast, the modern notion of a constitution as written law sees the 
declaration of a statute as unconstitutional as occurring within the 
context of normal governance: when a court finds a statute 
188 See id. 
189 !d. 
190 See Pendleton, supra note 6, at 426. 
191 See 1 GOEBEL, supra note 4, at 127-28 (suggesting that the reference was to 
Abingdon's work). 
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unconstitutional, it is simply choosing which of two laws to apply, 
the statute or the constitution. 
Chancellor Pendleton's opinion, as reflected in his notes, 
embodies the premises supporting judicial review, but it stops short 
of embracing judicial review. Pendleton begins the section of his 
opinion concerned with judicial review by observing that "very little 
light has been thrown upon the Subject, by researches into the 
history of other Countreys." 192 Even British precedent was 
useless: 
We find the same author Lord Coke asserting at one time the 
omnipotence of Parliament, who may even change the Consti[tu]-
tion, and another exalting the Judiciary above them, giving Courts 
power of declaring Acts of Parliament void because they are 
impertinent or contrary to right and Reason, both of which are 
mere speculative opinions and neither of them worthy of adoption 
by the Legislature or Judiciary. 193 
Virginia's written constitution made the controversy about a 
statute's constitutionality different from any European precedent: 
We however have happily in our hands the certain record of 
our Constitution containing the Original Social Compact, wherein 
the people have made their Government to consist of three great 
branches, the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary, allotting to 
each, its proper powers, and declaring that they shall be kept 
separate and distinct, neither exercising those which belong to 
another. Like all other declared Powers each has its limits, the 
Legislative as well as the others, which if they Pass, it would seem 
their Act would be void, as well as that of an Attorney would be, 
which was not Warranted by his appointment. 194 
This relatively brief passage strings together a number of critical 
points. The constitution is the original social compact. As 
Pendleton's use of words such as "allotting" and "declaring" 
indicates, he did not see the constitution as simply codifying pre-
existing power relations; it created power relations. The legislature 
was not, as it was in Blackstonian thought, supreme: its power was 
limited and its acts, "it would seem," could be "void. "195 The 
theory justifying those limits was a delegation theory: the people, 
192 Pendleton, supra note 6, at 422. 
19
' !d. (alteration in original). 
194 !d. 
195 !d. 
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through the constitution, vested only certain powers in the 
legislature and nothing more. 
The quoted text suggests that Pendleton was in favor of judicial 
review. The ideas that a branch of government had been delegated 
only limited powers, that a written constitution made those limits 
ascertainable, and that a legislative act exceeding the legislature's 
powers would be "void" became the critical elements in thejudicial 
review theories of Iredell, Hamilton, Wilson, and Marshall 196 (and, 
as we have seen, they were the critical elements in Tucker's and 
Randolph's approaches as well). During the Stamp Act crisis, as a 
justice in Caroline County, he had taken the position that the Stamp 
Act was inconsistent with the British Constitution and that the court 
should disregard it. 197 Moreover, in 1788, Pendleton would write 
an opinion for the court of appeals declaring that when "the 
constitution and the act are in opposition and cannot exist togeth-
er[,] ... the former must control the operation of the latter." 198 
In 1782, however, he refrained from reaching this conclusion and 
suggested that it was an open question whether at some point the 
judicial power to invalidate legislation arguably became a legislative 
power and hence unconstitutional: 
But how far this Court in which it has been properly said the 
Judiciary Powers of the State are concentrated, can go in declaring 
an Act of the Legislature void, because it is repugnant to the 
Constitution, without exercising the Power of Legislation, from 
which they are restrained by the same Constitution? is a deep, 
important, and, I will add, an awful question; from which, 
however, I will not shrink, if ever it shall become my duty to 
decide it: at present I am happy in having no occasion to make 
the decision .... 199 
Pendleton was able to avoid resolving the question whether a 
court had the power to invalidate statutes by deciding that the 
Treason Act was not in conflict with the constitution. He noted that 
he had been Speaker of the House at the time the statute was 
passed and that its constitutionality had been "[ w )armly" debated 
196 See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text (noting the judicial review 
theories of Iredell, Hamilton, Wilson, and Marshall). 
197 See 2 MAYS, supra note 6, at 168-71. 
198 Cases of the Judges of the Court of Appeals, 8 Va. (4 Call) 135, 142 ( 1788). 
For a discussion of these cases, see infra text accompanying notes 322-26. See also 2 
MAYS, supra note 6, at 199 (ascribing authorship of the principal opinion to 
Pendleton). 
199 Pendleton, supra note 6, at 422. 
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then. 200 He added that, as the presiding official, he had been 
unable to debate, but had decided that the statute was constitutional 
then and that "I have found no reason to alter [that opinion]." 201 
The question of what the constitution meant turned on whether 
"the power of pardoning is reserved to ... one or both houses [of 
the legislature]."202 This question, he declared, "should be decid-
ed according to the spirit, and not by the words of the constitu-
tion. "203 Pendleton noted Randolph's suggestion 
of throwing the words "or the laws shall otherwise particularly 
direct," into a Parenthesis, leaving the latter words to operate 
upon the cases of Prosecutions by the House of Delegates only, 
and the Legislature with full power to direct the mode of Pardon 
in other cases, in which they restrain the Executive.204 
He rejected this interpretation, however, because "it does not reach 
my Idea of the Spirit of the constitution"205 because it would 
permit the legislature to give the Senate exclusive power to pardon 
in all cases except those involving impeachments by the House of 
Delegates, thus dramatically diminishing the House of Delegates's 
role in pardoning. 206 Pendleton, however, adopted Randolph's 
other suggested reading. The constitutional language that non-
gubernatorial pardons could not be granted "but by resolve of the 
House of the Delegates"207 meant, according to Pendleton, that 
such pardons could not be granted "'without the Consent,' of the 
House of Delegates."208 Thus, the legislature could pass a statute 
that, in cases in which the Executive did not have the power to 
pardon, approval by the House of Delegates would be a necessary, 
but not sufficient, condition for a pardon. 
Approval by both legislative houses would thus be necessary for 
an effective pardon. Such a reading was "congenial to the spirit, 
and not inconsistent with the letter, of the constitution. "209 The 
Treason Act, because it was consistent with this reading of the 
200 !d. at 425. 
201 !d. at 426. 
202 Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5, 19 (1782). 
203 !d. 
204 Pendleton, supra note 6, at 424. 
205 !d. 
206 See id. at 424-25. 
207 !d. at 417 (emphasis omitted). See supra text accompanying note 34 for the 
complete constitutional clause. 
208 !d. at 425. 
209 8 Va. ( 4 Call) at 19. 
538 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143: 491 
constitution, was constitutional. Like Wythe, therefore, Pendleton 
read the constitution in a way that Randolph had proposed to the 
court but that Randolph had privately suggested, "to any but 
lawyers[,] ... would appear unintelligible. "210 Like the others, 
Pendleton was evidently attempting to avoid a holding that the 
constitution and the statute were at odds. At the same time, he did 
not make this interpretative approach explicit: he did not state that 
the constitution should be interpreted in a way that avoided a 
determination that a statute was inconsistent with it. 
Six days after the decision, Pendleton wrote Madison: 
The great Constitutional question, as it was called in our 
papers ... was determined in the Court of Appeals by 6 Judges 
against two, that the Treason Act was not at Variance with the 
Constitu[tion] but a proper exercise of the Power reserved to the 
Legislature by the latter, of directg. in what other cases besides 
that of Impeachments by the House of Delegates, the Executive 
should be restrain'd from Pardoning, including in it the power of 
directg the mode of Pardon in all such Cases, provided such mode 
should necessarily involve the Consent of the House of Delegates 
which it was thought preserved the Spirit of the Constitution & 
was the best Interpretation wch [sic] the Inaccurate words of the 
Constitution would admit of .... 211 
Thus, Pendleton acknowledged the constitution's ambiguity-its 
"Inaccurate words"-but the way in which the constitution had been 
construed pleased him. "[T]he Spirit of the Constitution" had been 
preserved. 
I. Aftermath 
The fact that two judges had explicitly embraced judicial 
review-perhaps the first judges to do so212-and the fact that the 
210 Letter from Edmund Randolph to james Madison (Nov. 8, 1782), in 5 MADISON 
PAPERS, supra note 8, at 262, 263; see also supra note 101 and accompanying text 
(noting Randolph's admission that his readings of the constitution were strained). 
211 Letter from Edmund Pendleton to James Madison (Nov. 8, 1782), in 5 
MADISON PAPERS, supra note 8, at 260, 261. 
212 The Case of the Prisoners is chronologically the third of the nine cases that have 
been advanced as possible revolutionary-era judicial review cases. See supra note 1. 
The weight of evidence indicates that, in fact, neither of the two earlier cases 
concerned the issue of judicial invalidation of legislation. In the oldest case-the 
josiah Philips Case-Virginia Attorney General Randolph decided not to proceed 
against Philips on a bill of attainder, limiting the prosecution to other grounds. 
There was, however, no judicial determination that the bill of attainder was 
unconstitutional. See 2 CROSSKEY, supra note I, at 944-45. In Holmes v. Walton, the 
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State's Attorney General had adopted the same position did not 
cause controversy. "[T]he Case of the Prisoners," Pendleton 
informed Madison in December, "was reduced to a thin[g] of small 
moment, by the opinion of the Court that the Treason law was not 
contrary to the constitution."213 
Although the court of appeals had concluded that the Treason 
Act was constitutional, the House of Delegates, taking a more 
rigorous view of the matter, disagreed. On November 19, 1782, it 
passed a resolution stating "[t]hat so much of the Act of the General 
Assembly, declaring 'what shall be treason,' as vests the power of 
pardon for such offences in the General Assembly is unconstitution-
al, and ought to be amended. "214 On November 23, 1782, the 
House followed up on its resolution and voted in favor of an act 
revising the Treason Act by vesting the power to pardon in the 
House of Delegates alone. 215 In its preamble, the act asserted "the 
bounden duty of the representatives of the People at all times to 
preserve the constitution inviolate. "216 Since the revised Treason 
Act was not enacted, however, the Senate presumably did not 
approve the bill, which suggests that the Senate believed that the 
existing Treason Act was constitutional. 
What is of critical importance is the fact that the Case of the 
Prisoners, unlike other revolutionary-era decisions in which judges 
suggested that they had the power to review statutes or refused to 
hold that they did not have that power, did not provoke a negative 
response. There is no record of popular criticism of the two judges 
who asserted that the judiciary had the power to invalidate statutes. 
There was no move in the Senate against them. Moreover, the 
only other case preceding the Case of the Prisoners, according to Professor Levy, "The 
constitutionality of the act was not at issue, and the court gave no opinion, not even 
in obiter dicta, on whether it had the power to void an act for unconstitutionality." 
LEVY, supra note 4, at 93. If this is accurate, the decisions of Wythe and Mercer in 
the Case of the Prisoners would be the first postindependence judicial assertions of the 
power to invalidate statutes. 
213 Letter from Edmund Pendleton to James Madison (Dec. 9, 1782), in 5 MADISON 
PAPERS, supra note 8, at 382, 382. 
214 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA; 
BEGUN AND HELD IN THE CITY OF RICHMOND, IN THE COUNTY OF HENRICO, ON 
MONDAY, THE TWENTY-FIRST DAY OF OCTOBER, IN THE YEAR OF OUR LORD ONE 
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-TWO 24 (Nov. 19, 1782) ( 1828) [hereinafter 
JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES). 
215 See id. at 33 (Nov. 23, 1782). 
216 Hutchinson & Rachal, Notes to Letter from Edmund Randolph to James 
Madison (Oct. 26, 1782), in 5 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 8, at 217, 219 n.IO 
(quoting preamble). 
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Senate joined the House in providing the three prisoners the relief 
that they had sought from the outset. On November 15, facing 
execution, the prisoners renewed their request for legislative 
pardons.217 This time both houses concurred. All were pardoned 
subject to satisfaction of a condition. Lamb and Hopkins were 
required to leave the state and Caton was required to serve in the 
revolutionary army for the remainder of the war.218 "[T]his 
method of recruiting has been used with several other Criminals," 
Pendleton wrote Madison, "and if they prove good Soldiers, they 
will make the state abundant amends for former offences. "219 
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CASE OF THE PRISONERS 
This section will explore the ways in which the case study 
presented in the previous section bear on a number of major 
questions concerning the development of judicial review and early 
conceptions of constitutional interpretation. Contrary to the work 
of Professor H. Jefferson Powell, 220 statements by participants in 
the Case of the Prisoners reveal the presence of a powerful 
antiliteralist approach to constitutional interpretation, one that 
looked beyond the text to the constitution's spirit and, in the case 
of Tucker, to evidence of the Framers' subjective original intent. 
Moreover, while leading modern accounts stress the constrained 
quality of early judicial review, both Tucker's argument and 
subsequent Virginia case law reflect an aggressive judicial stance. 
Finally, the case and its aftermath illuminate Marbury: if one 
views Chief Justice Marshall as the product of a Virginia legal and 
political culture which accepted judicial review early and relatively 
easily, his assertion in Marbury of the power to review congressional 
legislation becomes understandable in a way that is wholly different 
from the classic debates about Marbury. Traditionally, the debate 
about Marbury has turned on whether judicial review was part of the 
original understanding or whether Marshall's decision reflected his 
desire to see that a Federalist judiciary had the power to check the 
Republican executive and legislature. This section contends that it 
217 See jOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, supra note 214, at 18-19 (Nov. 15, 
1782). 
218 See id. at 58 (Dec. 4, 1782); Letter from Edmund Pendleton to James Madison 
(Dec. 9, 1782), in 5 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 8, at 382, 382. 
219 Letter from Edmund Pendleton to James Madison (Dec. 9, 1782), in 5 MADISON 
PAPERS, supra note 8, at 382, 382. 
220 See Powell, supra note 13. 
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was natural for a jurist produced by the Virginia political and legal 
culture to champion judicial review, regardless of his politics and 
regardless of whether judicial review was a consensus part of the 
original understanding of the constitution. 
A. Constitutional Interpretation 
1. Powell and Textualism 
In his influential article The Original Understanding of Original 
Intent, Professor Powell has argued that the Framers, members of 
the state ratifying conventions, and early interpreters of the 
Constitution believed that the subjective intent of the Framers was 
irrelevant to constitutional interpretation.221 Central to Powell's 
thesis is his analysis of the hermeneutical traditions that could have 
influenced the Framers. "Of the numerous hermeneutical options 
that were available in the framers' day," Powell writes, "none 
corresponds to the modern notion of intentionalism. "222 In other 
words, none supported consideration of the Framer's subjective 
intentions in constitutional exegesis. 
Powell contends that "[t]he two most obvious sources of 
hermeneutical wisdom [on which American constitutional interpret-
ers could draw] were the anti-interpretive tradition of Anglo-
American Protestantism and the accumulated interpretive tech-
niques of the common law." 223 The former tradition was Protest-
antism's "chaste literalism" which considered invalid "any exposition 
of the text that went beyond the text [itself]. "224 This view repre-
221 Powell, supra note 13. Powell's thesis has sparked substantial scholarly debate, 
although it has been fought largely on the terms of Powell's original article. In other 
words, participants in this controversy have parsed the debates in the Constitutional 
Convention, during the ratification controversy, and during the first years of the 
Republic for evidence of how the founding generation thought the Constitution 
should be construed. The two principal critics of Powell are Charles Lofgren and 
Raoul Berger. For Lofgren's critique, see generally Lofgren, supra note 13. For the 
debate between Powell and Berger, see Raoul Berger, The Founders' Views-According 
to Jefferson Powell, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1033, 1033-34 (1989); Raoul Berger, "Original 
Intention" in Historical Perspective, 54 CEO. WASH. L. REV. 296 ( 1 986); H. Jefferson 
Powell, The Modem MisunderstandingofOriginallntent, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513 (1987) 
(reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN ( 1 987) ). This Article 
departs from the earlier work by focusing on a case; this focus is particularly 
appropriate because that case-the Case of the Prisoners-contains relatively explicit 
discussions of how a constitution should be interpreted. 
222 Powell, supra note 13, at 948. 
223 !d. at 889. 
224 !d. at 889-90. 
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sented a rejection of Roman Catholicism's "tradition of interpreta-
tion, according to which literal exposition of the text was only one 
(and by no means necessarily the most important) methodolo-
gy. "225 Enlightenment thought reinforced this view. "The 
philosophes ... perceived traditional interpretation of Scripture as 
one of the chief props supporting the theological absurdities and 
religious oppression perpetrated by the established churches, and 
saw the niggling interpretation of complicated or obscure laws as a 
relic of feudal misrule and political tyranny. "226 "Such cultural 
reluctance to admit the legitimacy of significant interpretation of 
written documents strongly influenced Americans in their conceptu-
alization of the task of interpreting their new Constitution. "227 
The second tradition was the common-law tradition: 
The modern practice of interpreting a law by reference to its 
legislative history was almost wholly nonexistent, and English 
judges professed themselves bound to honor the true import of 
the "express words" of Parliament .... Political and legal scholars 
in both Britain and the American colonies viewed strict judicial 
adherence to the legislature's language as a constitutional necessity 
228 
According to Powell, an exception to this rule "occurred when 
the statute's wording was ambiguous, rather than clear but in 
conflict with its apparent intent. "229 In this context, courts could 
look to evidence outside of the statute's text, but the search was 
highly constrained. They could consider the preamble of the 
statute, which Powell notes was not considered an "operative 
provision" of the statute.230 They could also consider prior usage 
under the statuteY1 The critical interpretive guide was previous 
judicial construction: "judicial precedent served as the most 
225 Id. at 889. 
226 Id. at 892. 
227 ld. at 893-94. 
228 Id. at 897-98. 
229 Id. at 898. Powell also discusses another exception to the rule that courts 
should not look beyond a statute's text: "where the text was defective on its face." 
ld. "In such situations," he writes, "judges were free to substitute coherence for 
gibberish." !d. Outside of the statutory context, Powell notes that courts construing 
wills "purport[ed] to pay particular attention to the subjective intentions of their 
drafters," but this concern was "largely illusory." Id. at 896. 
230 ld. at 899. 
231 See id. 
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important source of information about an act's meaning beyond its 
actual text. "232 "This followed almost by definition from the basic 
notion of 'intent' as a product of the interpretive process rather 
than something locked into the text by its author. "233 
But even in such cases of statutory ambiguity the legislators' 
subjective intent was still not a source courts could consult. "It was 
generally agreed that such ambiguitas patens could not be resolved 
by extrinsic evidence as to Parliament's purpose. "234 Although 
references were made to "intent," the word was a term of art, 
signifying "not ... what the drafters meant by their words but 
rather . . . what judges, employing the 'artificial reason and 
judgement of the law,' understood 'the reasonable and legal 
meaning' of those words to be. "235 
Aware of both the religious tradition's and the common law 
tradition's relevance to constitutional interpretation, the drafters of 
the Constitution believed the latter would prove dominant: 
The Philadelphia framers' primary expectation regarding constitu-
tional interpretation was that the Constitution, like any other legal 
document, would be interpreted in accord with its express 
language . . . . The framers shared the traditional common law 
view-so foreign to much hermeneutical thought in more recent 
years-that the import of the document they were framing would 
be determined by reference to the intrinsic meaning of its words 
or through the usual judicial process of case-by-case interpreta-
tion.2g6 
Early debates about the Constitution's meaning also reflected 
the influence of the two traditions. During the struggle for 
ratification, "Federalists ... treated the availability of common law 
hermeneutics as a positive good: precisely because there was a 
developed tradition of legal interpretation, they argued, the people 
could predict with confidence the results of future constitutional 
construction. "237 In the political battles of the 1790s over the 
Constitution, the members of the Federalist party relied on the 
common law interpretive model. "The Republicans, in contrast, 
took up the cudgels of the religious and philosophical opposition to 
252 /d. 
mid. 
2
" /d. at 898. 
n• /d. at 896 (citations omitted). 
2!6 /d. at 903-04. 
m /d. at 913. 
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interpretation and warned that the 'wiles of construction' could be 
controlled only by a narrow reading of the Constitution's expansive 
language. "238 
Significant appeals to original intent of any sort only began in 
1798 with the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, written by 
Madison and Jefferson, respectively, as criticisms of the Alien and 
Sedition Acts. Jefferson and Madison "broke new ground" 239 by 
invoking the official resolutions that various states had made when 
ratifying the Constitution as terms of the constitutional contract. 
"[B]y focusing attention on a past historical event Jefferson and 
Madison raised the possibility that other historical documents might 
be relevant to determining the state's original intent. "240 Even 
Madison, who became the principal theorist of this new "original 
intent" approach, did not, however, embrace anything like modern 
intentionalism. He never "regarded historical evidence of the 
framers' personal intentions as a definitive or even particularly 
valuable guide to constitutional construction. "241 
2. The Case of the Prisoners, Original 
Intent, and Antiliteralism 
Powell's argument about the understanding that the Framers 
had when they wrote the Constitution and of how the Constitution 
would be interpreted is based on inference. As he acknowledges, 
"the Philadelphia framers did not discuss in detail how they 
intended their end product to be interpreted. "242 His claim that 
Protestant literalism and common-law hermeneutics were the 
principal influences on early thinking about constitutional interpre-
tation thus does not reflect the fact that any contemporaneous 
commentator asserted that these were the appropriate guides. It 
largely reflects, instead, Powell's belief that these were the "two 
most obvious sources of hermeneutical wisdom. "243 
While he focuses on the English legal tradition, Powell does not 
discuss the American legal tradition-and specifically the judicial 
review cases of the revolutionary era. That he did not do so is 
understandable. Although scholars dispute precisely which of the 
238 /d. at 923 (citation omitted). 
239 /d. at 932. 
2
'
0 /d. at 933 (emphasis omitted). 
2
'
1 /d. at 944. 
2
'
2 /d. at 904. 
243 !d. at 889. 
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revolutionary-era cases invalidated statutes, it is clear that in these 
cases, courts either invalidated statutes principally for their failure 
to comply with some extraconstitutional source, such as natural law 
or tradition, or at least considered whether they could invalidate 
statutes on such grounds. Thus, they shed little light on what 
background notions concerning constitutional interpretation were 
available to the Framers. The Case of the Prisoners is the only 
revolutionary-era case in which we have a record of a court paying 
close attention to the interpretation of a written constitution.244 
The previously known documents from attorneys who argued in 
these early cases also provide little illumination on constitutional 
interpretation. For example, the letters to the public of James 
Iredell, the attorney in Bayard v. Singleton, at the time of the Case of 
the Prisoners, concern his defense of judicial review as an institution, 
not the argument that he made in the case as to why the challenged 
statute was unconstitutional. 245 Attorney James Varnum's argument 
in Trevett v. Weeden was principally based on natural law. 246 
Varnum was unable to invoke a popularly enacted state constitution 
for a very obvious reason: Rhode Island's Charter of 1663 remained 
in effect. 247 Alexander Hamilton's argument in Rutgers v. 
Waddington concerned a claim that a New York statute violated the 
law of nations. 248 
Tucker's and Randolph's notes and other primary source 
material concerning the Case of the Prisoners are the best guides we 
have from the revolutionary era as to the Framers' view of constitu-
tional interpretation. Admittedly, too much should not be read into 
documents from a single case. But, given the dearth of other 
information, the surviving material from the Case of the Prisoners 
becomes of critical significance. And evidence provided by the Case 
of the Prisoners suggests the prevalence of views of constitutional 
2
" See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
245 See Iredell, supra note 91; see also Letter from james Iredell to Richard Spaight 
(Aug. 26, 1787), in 2 MCREE, supra note 91, at 172. 
246 See VARNUM, supra note 1, at 11-17 (discussing the fundamental right to trial 
by jury). 
247 Fo1· the provisions of the Rhode Island Charter, see 5 THORPE, supra note 12, 
at 3211. 
248 See Brief No.6 for Waddington, Rutgers v. Waddington (N.Y. City Mayor's Ct. 
I784), reprinted in I GOEBEL, supra note I, at 362, 368. This argument is not 
developed; Hamilton simply made the point indicated in the text. See id. Hamilton's 
argument was indirectly a constitutional argument because the New York Constitution 
adopted the common law and, Hamilton asserted, the law of nations was a part of the 
common law. 
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interpretation that are inconsistent with Powell's account. Specifi-
cally, analysis of the record of the case does not support Powell's 
view that the only interpretive traditions available to Americans 
were predominantly or exclusively textualist and that early interpre-
tations of the Constitution were similarly textualist. 
One example of the fact that participants in the case did not 
privilege text in the way that Powell's thesis would suggest is 
provided by Chancellor Pendleton's note to Madison after the case 
ended. Pendleton observed that the court's construction of the 
constitution was one "which it was thought preserved the Spirit of 
the Constitution [and] was the best Interpretation wch [sic] the 
Inaccurate words of the Constitution would admit of."249 This 
statement reflects the belief that the constitutional text was 
indeterminate and that constitutional "Spirit" was relevant to 
interpretation. His opinion in the case also reflects a concern with 
interpreting the constitution in accordance with its spirit. The 
question whether one or both Houses had the power to pardon 
"should be decided according to the spirit, and not by the words of 
the constitution."250 The chancellor rejected one of Randolph's 
readings of the constitution because "it does not reach my Idea of 
the Spirit of the constitution."251 The reading that Pendleton 
embraced was "most congenial to the spirit, and not inconsistent 
with the letter, of the constitution." 252 
Randolph's and Tucker's notes provide more detailed evidence 
of a limited commitment to text as a source of meaning. At the 
core of their arguments were their invocations of the Virginia 
Constitution's spirit. Randolph contrasted construction of a 
constitution with construction of a statute. In the construction of 
a statute "the masculine force of substantial sense is too often 
subjected to the petty tyranny of grammatical rule, "253 but with a 
constitution "the liberality, necessary to catch its spirit, must be 
adopted." 254 Thus, whereas Powell sees the common-law herme-
neutic as establishing the very limited outer bounds for the use of 
nontextual sources, Randolph specifically rejects the common-law 
tradition because it is too text-bound-"subjected to the petty 
249 Letter from Edmund Pendleton to James Madison (Nov. 8, 1782), in 5 
MADISON PAPERS, supra note 8, at 260, 261. 
25° Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. ( 4 Call) 5, 19 ( 1782). 
251 Pendleton, supra note 6, at 424. 
252 8 Va. ( 4 Call) at 19. 
m Randolph, supra note 8, at 3. 
254 ld. 
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tyranny of grammatical rule" -and therefore lacking the "liberality, 
necessary to catch [the constitution's] spirit. "255 
In setting forth his vision of the constitution's spirit, Randolph 
appealed to framers' intent: "[E]very argument which tends to the 
propriety of uniting [the Senate] in pardoning in these instances [of 
impeachments], will prove the great improbability of their exclusion 
being intended in any other. "256 As previously noted, Randolph 
did not ascertain intent by discussing evidence of the subjective 
intent of the framers. Nonetheless, as Randolph's explicit rejection 
of the common-law tradition indicates, his approach was still much 
less constrained by the text than the common-law tradition would 
have dictated. Rather than seeking relevant judicial precedent or 
resting his claims on traditional canons of construction, Randolph 
advanced an argument that was largely structural, highlighting the 
selection process for senators and constitutional limits on the 
Senate's power: selected by the people, rather than inheriting their 
office, unable to originate or amend money bills, senators were not 
"by their powers as much of aristocracy as would hang on an aspin 
[sic] leaf. "257 Moving even farther beyond the text, Randolph also 
reminded the court of who the senators were and that they were the 
same kind of people as those who sat in the House of Delegates: 
"[Treason) strikes as deep into the happiness of the Senate as 
citizens, and their existence as a body. Their judgment will be as 
keen, and irritation vs. the offense as acute [as the House of 
Delegates)."258 In essence, Randolph was making the claim that 
the framers had no reason to deny the senators a role in the 
pardoning power because they would not be aristocrats and that the 
constitution should be interpreted accordingly. In Powell's account, 
structuralism and original intent enter American constitutional 
discourse with the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, and in both 
doctrines were used in a very limited fashion: "The intentionalism 
of the Resolutions was therefore a form of structural interpretation 
carried out by inference from the nature both of compacts and of 
sovereignty. It was the 'intent' of the states as political entities that 
the Resolutions deemed normative for purposes of constitutional 
interpretation. "259 
255 /d. 
256 /d. at 4 (emphasis added}. 
257 /d. at 5. 
258 /d. at 6. 
259 Powell, supra note 13, at 931. 
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In addition, Randolph took the position that in cases in which 
a statute was challenged, unless text and spirit were in direct 
opposition, the spirit of the constitution controlled constitutional 
interpretation, even over the text's apparent meaning. "For if [the 
constitution's] spirit opposes the exclusion of the Senate, its words 
must be free from ambiguity and decided, or cannot have the 
supremacy. "260 Randolph thus was shifting the burden with 
respect to the judicial obligation to follow the text. While in 
statutory construction "the masculine form of substantial sense is 
too often subjected to the petty tyranny of grammatical rule," in 
constitutional interpretation the spirit controls, unless the text is 
unambiguous. 261 The extent to which Randolph believed spirit 
superior to plain textual meaning is indicated by his observation to 
Madison that "I doubt not, that to any but lawyers the construction, 
by which the two [statutory and constitutional provisions) were 
reconcile[ d,] would appear unintelligible. "262 
Appeals to the spirit of the constitution are, if anything, even 
more central to Tucker's argument than to Randolph's. Tucker 
appeals to the spirit of the constitution to justify the institution of 
judicial review when he invokes Montesquieu for the view that "the 
same Man or body of Men should not enact Laws, or afterwards 
carry them into Execution" and adds that that view of limited 
powers "is also the Spirit of our Constitution. "263 He invokes it 
again as a basis for constitutional interpretation: "the Spirit of our 
Constitution declares that the power of pardoning in all Cases 
where it is not given to the Executive, is vested in the House of 
Delegates alone. "264 
As previously discussed, in locating spirit, Tucker specifically 
turned to the subjective intent of the framers: "I am informed by 
an honourable member of the G.C. that it was the Intention of the 
Constitution to have as few obstacles as possible in the way to 
mercy. "265 Thus, Tucker's notes reflect an approach to constitu-
tional interpretation consistent with modern original intent 
jurisprudence. In other words, Tucker's approach was opposite to 
that which Powell ascribes to the framers. 
260 Randolph, supm note 8, at 6. 
261 /d. at 3. 
262 Letter from Edmund Randolph to james Madison (Nov. 8, 1782), in 5 MADISON 
PAPERS, supra note 8, at 262, 263. 
265 Tucker, supra note 8, at 4. 
264 /d. at 11 (emphasis omitted). 
265 /d. 
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It should be added that not everyone in the case stressed spirit. 
Andrew Ronald, the attorney for the prisoners, employed arguments 
that embody the hermeneutical approaches discussed by Powell. He 
attacked Randolph's use of original intent, saying "the words of the 
constitution, and not conjectures drawn from the supposed meaning 
of the framers of it, should give the rule." 266 He appealed to text: 
"the act of assembly was contrary to the plain declaration of the 
constitution; and therefore void." 267 He acknowledged that 
ambiguity was possible, but suggested a canon of construction as a 
way to resolve it: "the construction ought, in favour of life, to 
incline to the side of mercy. "268 
Thus, the Case of the Prisoners does not suggest that Powell's 
account is wrong. It does suggest that that account is incomplete. 
There were other interpretive approaches available to the Framers 
of the United States Constitution, and, if the Case of the Prisoners is 
representative, those approaches may have been dominant. In 
particular, both Tucker, by invoking the subjective intent of the 
framers of the Virginia Constitution, and Randolph, by rejecting the 
traditional approach of statutory interpretation, embraced interpre-
tive stances at odds with those of Powell. 
The appeals to the spirit of the Virginia Constitution made by 
Randolph, Tucker, and Pendleton accord, not with Powell's vision, 
but with Professor Morton Horwitz's novel claim in his 1993 
Harvard Foreword, The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality 
Without Fundamentalism, that "a distinct anti-literalism seems to have 
been present among some of the Virginia founders." 269 Horwitz 
invokes two examples in support of this thesis. The first is Madison, 
and specifically his statement in Federalist No. 37: 
[1-I]owever accurately objects may be discriminated in themselves, 
and however accurately the discrimination may be considered, the 
definition of them may be rendered inaccurate by the inaccuracy 
of the terms in which it is delivered. And this unavoidable 
inaccuracy must be greater or less, according to the complexity 
and novelty of the objects .... 270 
266 Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. ( 4 Call) 5, 7 (1782). 
267 !d. 
268 !d. 
269 Horwitz, supm note 17, at 49. 
270 THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 229 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961 ), 
quoted in Horwitz, supm note 17, at 50. 
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The second example is Chief Justice Marshall and in particular his 
statement in McCulloch that the federal government could employ 
"means" that were "appropriate" to achieve "legitimate" ends, and 
that among the appropriate means were those that "consist with the 
letter and spirit of the constitution."271 Horwitz writes: "The 
distinction between the letter and spirit appears to have been a 
major source of anti-literalism during the nineteenth century. "272 
The statements from the Case of the Prisoners that have been 
discussed reveal the same awareness evidenced in the examples 
cited by Horwitz of the limits of text and the appropriateness of 
looking beyond text to establish a rule of law. Thus, these state-
ments provide support for Horwitz's thesis about antiliteralism and 
indicate that antiliteralism predated the framing of the Constitution. 
They also show that the antiliteralist approach could be employed 
notjust to empower the national government (as Marshall used it), 
but also to invalidate statutes passed by a coequal branch of the 
same government (as Tucker urged). 
Horwitz suggests that the antiliteralist approach drew on two 
hermeneutic traditions. First, it drew on a Protestant evangelical 
tradition that stressed the spirit of the law (to which all had access) 
over the letter (of which the learned clergy claimed a superior 
mastery). 273 Second, it reflected the influence of eighteenth 
century Scottish Enlightenment thinkers such as David Hume, 
whose work stressed the multiplicity of meanings that particular 
language could yield. 274 Both such influences are plausible. In 
particular, Scottish Enlightenment philosophy clearly influenced 
Tucker, who referred to Frances Hutcheson's Moral Philosophy in his 
law lectures. 275 In addition to these two traditions, a third merits 
mention. A relatively lax form of Anglicanism was the dominant 
religion among the Virginia elite, 276 and the Anglican tradition 
271 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819), discussed in 
Horwitz, supra note 17, at 50. 
272 Horwitz, supra note 17, at 50-51. 
m See id. at 50 n.90. 
274 See id. at 49 & n.86. 
27s See CULLEN, supra note 8, at 145. On Scottish Enlightenment thought 
generally, see GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA 175·92 ( 1978); William Michael 
Treanor, Taking the Framers Seriously, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1016, 1028·31 (1988) (book 
review). 
276 See SYDNEY E. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 188· 
92 ( 1972) (discussing the Anglican establishment in Virginia and noting that strict 
Anglicanism was not observed); see also RHYS ISAAC, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
VIRGINIA, 1740·1790, at 278·93 (1982) (describing the unsuccessful attempt by the 
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cautioned against acceptance of the biblical text as literally true.2'7 
Thus, there were other hermeneutic traditions beyond those 
identified by Powell that were available to revolutionary Americans 
and that did not rely on text to the same degree as the interpretive 
traditions he identifies. The principal point here, however, is not 
to identify specific sources of influence, but to indicate that the Case 
of Prisoners fits into a larger tradition in late-eighteenth-century 
America of antiliteralism. That tradition is perhaps best summed 
up by one of Hamilton's briefs in Rutgers: "In law as in Religion 
THE LETTER KILLS The SPIRIT MAKES ALIVE. "278 While 
Hamilton's specific concern in making this argument in Rutgers was 
with statutory interpretation, the Case of the Prisoners suggests that 
this extratextual focus had application to constitutional interpreta-
tion as well. 
If one takes a nonliteral approach to text, then the question 
becomes what other sources to look to, beyond the text, in deriving 
meaning. Tucker invoked the Framer's subjective intent. Again, 
one can use the Case of the Prisoners as a starting point and fit this 
evidence into a larger framework. Contrary to Powell's thesis, from 
the start of the Republic, leading politicians appealed to Framers' 
intent as a way of resolving constitutional controversy. Thus, in 
1791, in the dispute over whether Congress had the power to 
charter a national bank, Jefferson argued that it did not, because the 
Framers had voted against giving Congress the power to charter 
corporations. 279 In 1796, Washington refused Congress's request 
for the executive branch's files on the controversial treaty that John 
Jay had negotiated with the British in part on the grounds that the 
Philadelphia convention had rejected a proposal that all treaties be 
confirmed by statute.280 Powell dismisses these examples as 
Virginia gentry to reestablish the Anglican Church after independence, in response 
to a perceived decline in public morals attributable to the contemporaneous 
deterioration of Anglican institutions in Virginia). 
277 See HANS W. FREI, THE ECLIPSE OF BIBLICAL NARRATIVE: A STUDY IN 
EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURY HERMENEUTICS 51-54 ( 1 974); ROBERT GRANT 
WITH DAVID TRACY, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE INTERPRETATION OF THE BIBLE 103-04 
(2d ed. 1984 ). 
278 Brief No. 6 for Waddington, Rutgers v. Waddington (N.Y. City Mayor's Ct. 
1784), in 1 GOEBEL, supra note 1, at 391. 
279 See 5 THOMAS JEFFERSON, Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank 
( 1791), in THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 284, 287 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1895), 
discussed in Powell, supra note 13, at 914-15 & nn.l52-53. 
280 See 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 760-61 (1796), discussed in Powell, supra note 13, at 
920-21. 
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aberrational. 281 But when such uses of history are considered in 
the context of the evidence from the Case of the Prisoners, it seems 
to be the case that invocations of intent were part of the discourse 
concerning constitutional interpretation from the very start of such 
discourse in the revolutionary era. 
3. Antiliteralism and Judicial Stance 
The Case of the Prisoners also shows that antiliteralist approaches 
to judicial review could differ significantly. On one hand, Ran-
dolph's approach is very deferential to the legislature. Thus, he 
wrote, "For if [the constitution's] spirit opposes the exclusion of the 
Senate, its words must be free from ambiguity and decided, or 
cannot have the supremacy."282 Unless the text of the constitution 
is clearly inconsistent with the statute, the statute will be constitu-
tional. Randolph's conception of a constrained scope of judicial 
review is consistent with the one that Professor James Bradley 
Thayer was to adopt in 1893 in his essay, The Origin and Scope of the 
American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 283 which profoundly in-
fluenced, among others, Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Frankfurt-
er,284 as well as Judge Learned Hand,285 and which Frankfurter 
called the most important law review article on American constitu-
tional law ever written.286 Thayer catalogued the language of early 
judicial review cases concerning when a statute should be held 
invalid and noted that the cases repeatedly stated that statutes 
should not be held unconstitutional unless they clearly violated the 
constitution.287 He stated that this approach was first "foreshad-
owed"288 by Pendleton's opinion in the Case of the Prisoners, declar-
281 See Powell, supra note 13, at 920-21 (discussing criticism of Washington for 
invocation of original intent and stating that Madison's response to Washington's act 
was one of "amazement"); id. at 915 n.153 (referring to "Jefferson's unusual resort 
to 'legislative history' from the Philadelphia convention's nominally secret proceed-
ings"). 
282 Randolph, supra note 8, at 6. 
283 Thayer, supra note 3. 
28
' See Wallace Mendelson, The Influence of james B. Thayer upon the Work of Holmes, 
Brandeis, and Frankfurter, 31 VAND. L. REV. 71 (1 978). For recent analyses of Thayer's 
work, see Symposium, One Hundred Years of judicial Review: The Thayer Centennial 
Symposium, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1993). 
285 See GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 118-19 
( 1 994). 
286 See HARLAN B. PHILLIPS, FELIX FRANKFURTER REMINISCES 299-301 ( 1 960). 
287 See Thayer, supra note 3, at 138-42. 
288 !d. at 140. 
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ing that the legitimacy of judicial review was a "deep, important, 
and, I will add, a tremendous question, the decision of which would 
involve consequences to which gentlemen may not . . . have 
extended their ideas. "289 Drawing on the early cases, Thayer then 
framed a deferential rule of judicial review that he argued should 
continue to guide judicial assertions of the power to invalidate 
statutes: "[A court] can only disregard the Act when those who have 
the right to make laws have not merely made a mistake, but have 
made a very clear one,-so clear that it is not open to rational 
question. "290 
The notion that the early theories of judicial review involved a 
high degree of deference to legislatures has more recently been 
championed by Professor Sylvia Snowiss. In her book judicial 
Review and the Law of the Constitution, 291 the most complete study 
of early conceptions of judicial review, Snowiss contends that, in the 
period before Marbury, judicial review theory and practice were "to 
confine the concededly unconstitutional act, to circumstances where 
it was agreed that the legislature had 'in fact' violated the constitu-
tion."292 Again, Randolph's argument exemplifies this view. 
Tucker's argument, however, does not. Tucker's conception of 
judicial review is aggressive. Statutes can be held unconstitutional 
if they violate the "spirit" of the constitution. The judiciary is the 
"Guardian" of the constitution. Admittedly, Tucker states that, "If 
any act thereof shall be found absolutely and irreconcilably contrary 
to the Constitution, it can not admit of a Doubt that such act is 
absolutely null and void, "293 suggesting that "irreconcilabl[ e ]" 
contradiction is necessary for an act to be judicially pronounced 
unconstitutional. But, as Tucker's argument demonstrates, "ir-
reconcilabl[ e ]" contradiction can occur simply because a statute 
violates the spirit of the constitution. The deceptive character of 
Tucker's rhetoric suggests that, in some of the cases relied on by 
Thayer, judicial claims that statutes would not be held unconstitu-
289 !d. at 140 (quoting Pendleton's opinion in Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 
Call) 5, 17 ( 1782)). 
290 ld. at 144. 
291 SNOWISS, supra r.ote 4. 
292 !d. at 34. Professor Robert Clinton has offered another way of viewing the 
cases prior to the Federal Constitutional Convention as embodying a constrained 
conception of judicial review. By his count, four of the six cases involved the right 
to a trial by jury, and he suggests that the primary focus of the early cases was on 
protecting judicial independence from legislative interference. See CLINTON, supra 
note 3, at 54-55. 
29
' Tucker, supra note 8, at 9. 
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tiona} in "doubtful" cases may not in fact mean that those courts 
read the power of judicial review narrowly. 
More basically, Tucker's argument in the Case of the Prisoners 
suggests the presence, in early discussions of judicial review, of a 
conception of judicial review that is far broader than that described 
by Thayer and Snowiss. While it is beyond the scope of this Article 
to trace this alternative tradition of broad judicial review, the 1793 
case of judicial review Kamper v. Hawkins, 294 the next case in which 
a Virginia court confronted an unconstitutional statute, illustrates 
that Tucker's argument in the Case of the Prisoners was not an aberra-
tional statement of a young attorney. In Kamper, all five members 
of the Virginia General Court held unconstitutional a 1792 statute 
that gave district courts equitable powers. In their opinions, two of 
the Kamper judges adopted broad views of judicial review. 295 One, 
not surprisingly, was Tucker, who had ascended to the bench in 
1788.296 
Tucker's view of judicial review remained consistent with his 
view at the time of the Case of the Prisoners. Indeed, several weeks 
after he issued his opinion in Kamper, he re-read his notes of his 
argument in the Case of the Prisoners and wrote on the jacket: "Upon 
reviewing (my notes] at the distance of eleven years I find I have not 
changed my opinion .... "297 Echoing his argument in the Case 
of the Prisoners, Tucker in Kamper appealed to "the text of the 
constitution, and the spirit of our government. "298 He noted that 
the legislature had repealed statutes that were "'contrary to the true 
294 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20 (1793). For an excellent discussion of the different 
conceptions of judicial review in the case, see H. Jefferson Powell, The Uses of State 
Constitutional History: A Case Note, in TOWARD A USABLE PAST: LIBERTY UNDER STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS 196 (Paul Finkelman & Stephen E. Gottlieb eds., 1991 ). The only 
instances between the Case of the Prisoners and Kamper in which a Virginia court 
evaluated the constitutionality of a statute were the Cases of the Judges of the Court 
of Appeals, 8 Va. (4 Call) 135 (1788). In the principal opinion, the court of appeals 
pronounced a state statute imposing additional duties on judges without additional 
compensation an "infraction of the constitution." /d. at 146. This opinion, however 
was not the product of a litigated case; it was merely a judicial pronouncement, sua 
sponte, on a recently passed statute. See infra text accompanying notes 325-26. 
295 See Kamper, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) at 29-42, 66-97 (wherein both Judge Roane and 
Judge Tucker espoused broad judicial review). 
296 See CULLEN, supra note 8, at 75. 
297 Tucker, supra note 8 (note on jacket). He added that "the haste with which it 
was formed produced several inaccuracies which at this day perhaps I might have 
avoided," but did not specify what those inaccuracies were. /d. 
298 Kamper, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) at 68 (Tucker,].). 
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sp1nt of the constitution. "'299 Nonetheless, he again saw the 
judiciary as uniquely entrusted with the protection of the constitu-
tion. "[T]he duty of expounding [the constitution]," he wrote at 
one point, "must be exclusively vested in the judiciary. "300 At 
another point, Tucker observed that "the principles of our govern-
ment have established the judiciary as a barrier against the possible 
usurpation, or abuse of power in the other departments. "301 
In his decision in Kamper, Judge Spencer Roane, whom legend 
asserts Thomas Jefferson would have named Chief Justice had John 
Adams not placed John Marshall on the bench in the waning days 
of Adams's administration,302 similarly took an expansive view of 
the judicial role. At greater length than Tucker, Roane invoked the 
spirit of the constitution as the basis for an assertion of judicial 
review: 
[T]he judiciary may and ought to adjudge a law unconstitutional 
and void, if it be plainly repugnant to the letter of the Constitu-
tion, or the fundamental principles thereof. By fundamental 
principles, I understand, those great principles growing out of the 
Constitution, by the aid of which, in dubious cases, the Constitu-
tion may be explained and preserved inviolate; those land-marks, 
which it may be necessary to resort to, on account of the impossi-
bility to foresee or provide for cases within the spirit, but without 
the letter of the Constitution.303 
Roane, therefore, very clearly took the position that a statute could 
be unconstitutional if it violated the spirit of the constitution, even 
though it was consistent with the constitutional text. 
Because of this emphasis on the spirit in interpreting constitu-
tional text, the Case of the Prisoners and Kamper also bear on a theory 
of judicial review very different from Thayer's and Snowiss's, the 
theory offered by Professor Suzanna Sherry. While Thayer and 
Snowiss have stressed the constrained quality of early judicial 
review, Sherry has sought to create an originalist basis for a more 
activist judiciary by stressing the natural law dimension of the 
299 !d. at 76 (quoting Virginia statute). 
~00 ld. at 79. 
~01 Id. at 87. 
~02 See MARGARET E. HORSNELL, SPENCER ROANE: JUDICIAL ADVOCATE OF 
JEFFERSONIAN PRINCIPLES 33-34 ( 1 986) (noting the legend, although suggesting "there 
is reason to doubt [it]"). 
~0~ Kamper, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) at 40 (Roane,].). 
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cases decided prior to the Federal Constitutional Convention and 
by arguing for the revival of natural law.304 In developing her 
historical arguments, she separates judicial review cases decided 
under a constitution from those decided under extraconstitutional 
law. "Where the written constitution affirmatively addressed a 
problem-most often in governmental structure cases such as Caton, 
but even in cases, such as Bayard, where the constitution provided 
clear protection of individual rights-it was dispositive, but in other 
cases, judges looked outside the written constitution. "305 The Case 
of the Prisoners and Kamper suggest that this bifurcation is too rigid. 
Invocations of the spirit in these structural cases decided under 
written constitutions indicate that extraconstitutional sources could 
inform even such cases. At the same time, the evidence offered 
here supports an end similar to Professor Sherry's. She has written: 
"Especially in the cases furthest from the constitutional language, 
this tacit preference for textual constitutionalism over natural law 
concepts undermines the Court's decision by allowing critics to 
attack the decision using the Court's own criteria of decision 
making,"306 and she offered the criticism of Roe v. Wade307 as an 
example. To the extent that Sherry's concern is with providing an 
historical basis for judicial activism that looks beyond the letter of 
the Constitution, Tucker and Roane provide such a basis, although, 
rather than invoking natural law, they were taking the position that 
courts could read a written constitution broadly. 
The evidence discussed here from the Case of the Prisoners and 
Kamper is obviously far too limited to support a conclusion as to 
what theories of judicial review were dominant at the birth of the 
nation. My point here is simply to highlight the range of arguments 
available. Powell's work has previously revealed the presence of a 
textualist approach. What the Case of the Prisoners (supported by 
Kamper) demonstrates is the presence of an antiliteralist approach 
to judicial review, and it also demonstrates that that approach, in 
turn, could support both judicial deference (as with Randolph) and 
assertiveness (as with Tucker and Roane). 
504 See Sherry, supra note I, at II76-77. 
505 /d. at II45-46; see also supra note I2 (discussing Bayard). 
506 Sherry, supra note I, at II76. 
507 4IO u.s. II3 (1973). 
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B. Chief Justice Marshall and the Origins of Judicial Review 
Historian Charles Beard began his classic 1912 article on judicial 
review, The Supreme Court-Usurper or Grantee?, with the question, 
"Did the framers of the federal Constitution intend that the 
Supreme Court should pass upon the constitutionality of acts of 
Congress?"308 After reviewing the evidence bearing on this 
question, he concluded the piece with the statement: "[I]t is 
difficult to understand the temerity of those who speak of the power 
asserted by Marshall in Marbury v. Madison as 'usurpation.'"309 
The linkage is typical. Traditionally, scholars have treated as in-
extricably joined the question whether Marshall acted in good faith 
in proclaiming judicial review in Marbury and the question whether 
the Framers intended judicial review. 
In seeking to determine original intent about judicial review, 
academics have looked primarily to the debates in Philadelphia, to 
the state ratifying debates (where, outside of Virginia, the topic 
provoked relatively little comment), to the early cases in which 
courts confronted the issue of whether they had the power to 
invalidate statutes, and to the popular reactions to those decisions. 
The comments made in Philadelphia have been parsed very 
differently, although there is general agreement that, to the extent 
the matter was reflected on, federal judicial review of state legisla-
tion was deemed necessary to insure consistency with the United 
States Constitution. At the same time, scholars have often stressed 
that judicial review was controversial at the time the Constitution 
was framed. 310 
In large part, the evidence for the conclusion that judicial review 
was not generally accepted is that the cases on which scholars have 
traditionally focused-Rutgers v. Waddington, 311 Trevett v. Wee-
den, 312 and Bayard v. Singleton 313-are cases in which the decisions 
proved controversial. (These cases have been the center of 
attention because, until this Article, they were the ones about which 
308 Charles A. Beard, The Supreme Court-Usurper or Grantee~. 27 POL. SCI. Q. I, I 
(I9I2). 
309 /d. at 34. 
310 See e.g., LEVY, supra note 4, at 89-I23 (discussing evidence on judicial review 
and the original understanding and scholarly debate on the subject). 
311 N.Y. City Mayor's Ct. I784, reprinted in I GOEBEL, supra note I, at 392-4I9. 
312 R.I. I786, described in VARNUM, supra note I. 
313 I N.C. (Mart.) 48 (I787). 
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the most was known.314 ) When Judge Duane, the judge in Rutgers, 
construed New York's Trespass Act in a way that avoided conflict 
between it and either the law of nations or the common law, but 
that was inconsistent with its apparent meaning, a group of 
individuals, including prominent politician Melancton Smith, 
published a sharp criticism of the holding in the newspaper The New 
York Packet. 315 Additionally, the New York Assembly denounced 
the decision and made an unsuccessful attempt to oust the judge 
from office. 316 When the judges in Trevett dismissed the case after 
the defendant had challenged the Rhode Island Paper Money Act, 
the Rhode Island legislature summoned the judges in Trevett to 
determine the basis for the dismissal. When one judge argued that 
the statute was unconstitutional (although he also stated that the 
court's judgment had simply been that the statute was not "cogniza-
ble") and another spoke in favor of judicial independence, the 
legislature voted that it was not satisfied with the answers provided. 
At the next election, the legislature ousted four of the five judges 
who had sat on the provided case, reelecting only the judge who had 
been able to avoid stating his reasons for voting in the defendant's 
favor. 317 In contrast, there was no legislative reprimand when the 
court in Bayard held unconstitutional a statute that barred Tories 
from bringing suit to recover their confiscated properties, but even 
that case suggests significant opposition to judicial review. When 
the court initially delayed reaching a decision in the case, its 
members were called before the North Carolina legislature to 
determine if they were guilty of malpractice in office by disregard-
ing a statute (although a determination was made not to impeach 
them). 318 James Iredell's publication of his argument in favor of 
judicial review met with the famous response of Richard Spaight, 
one of North Carolina's representatives to the Federal Constitution-
al Convention, attacking judicial review.319 Even in North Caroli-
na, then, the assertion of judicial review was associated with 
514 See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text. 
515 See 1 GOEBEL, supra note 4, at 137 n.138 ("'That there should be a power 
vested in courts of judicature, whereby they might control the supreme Legislative 
power we think is absurd in itself. Such power in courts would be destructive of 
liberty, and remove all security of property.'"). 
516 See id. at 137. 
517 See id. at 140-41. 
319 See LEVY, supra note 4, at 98. 
519 See Letter from Richard Spaight to James Iredell (Aug. 12, 1787), in 2 MCREE, 
supra note 91, at 168, 168-70. 
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controversy, although of a less serious dimension than in either New 
York or Rhode Island. More broadly, scholars' focus on these three 
cases is probably responsible in large part for the accepted view 
that, to quote Professor Leonard Levy, the early judicial review 
precedents "show that it was nowhere established, indeed that it 
seemed novel, controversial, and an encroachment on legislative 
authority. Its exercise, even when imagined, was disputed and liable 
to provoke the legislature to retaliation."320 
Judicial review, however, was accepted in Virginia at the time of 
the convention. The Case of the Prisoners suggests Virginia's 
amenability to judicial review. According to Randolph, the initial 
reaction of the general court was to assert the power to invalidate 
statutes. In the court of appeals, two judges explicitly declared that 
they had the power to review statutes for constitutionality-probably 
the first judges in revolutionary America to hold that they had this 
power-and there was no adverse legislative response. The House 
of Delegates voted to amend the challenged statute. While the 
Senate did not concur, that decision did not represent defiance of 
the court of appeals, since the court had held the statute constitu-
tional. For challenging the legislature's authority, the prisoners, 
rather than being punished, benefitted, because both houses then 
voted to pardon them. No ongoing controversy existed for the 
papers to report. The matter had become one of "small moment," 
to quote Pendleton. 321 That Randolph felt duty bound to embrace 
judicial review at the expense of the prosecution's case simply 
highlights the fact that in 1782 in Virginia judicial review was a 
mainstream position. 
There is a counterargument to all of this: the absence of 
controversy may be a product of the fact that the prisoners, after all, 
completely lost their case-whereas the parties challenging the state 
statutes in Bayard, Rutgers, and Trevett all at least partially achieved 
the ends they sought. The subsequent history of judicial review in 
Virginia makes clear, however, that the prisoners' loss should not 
obscure Virginia's uniquely rapid acceptance of judicial review. Of 
course, that consensus was not universal. Madison, to cite the most 
prominent example, continued to wrestle with the legitimacy of 
judicial review. 322 Nonetheless, judicial review appears to have 
'
20 LEVY, supra note 4, at 99. 
'
21 Letter from Edmund Pendleton to James Madison (Dec. 9, 1782), in 5 MADISON 
PAPERS, supra note 8, at 382. 
'
22 See Charles F. Hobson, The Negative on Stale Laws: James Madison, the 
560 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143: 491 
gained broad approval very early. After the Case of the Prisoners, a 
Virginia court next addressed the legitimacy of judicial review in 
1788, when the court of appeals issued "The Respectful Remon-
strance of the court of appeals, "323 written by Chancellor Pend-
leton.324 Earlier that year, the legislature had passed a district court 
bill requiring the judges of the court of appeals to sit on the district 
court twice a year and providing no additional salary for these new 
obligations. Although the statute was not challenged in a case, the 
court of appeals nevertheless issued the Remonstrance. It stated 
that the statute violated the Virginia Constitution because the 
additional imposition of responsibilities without additional money 
was effectively a constitutionally prohibited diminution in judicial 
salary.325 The legislature responded by first suspending the 
challenged bill and then passing a court reorganization bill designed 
to meet the concerns of the judges.326 
Kamper v. Hawkins, 321 the 1794 decision in which the court of 
appeals unanimously concluded that a 1792 act gave the district 
courts equitable powers, has already been discussed. 328 Unlike the 
Remonstrance, this was an actual case, one that turned on whether 
the district court could legitimately exercise its statutorily vested 
powers. This unanimous decision reflects the acceptance of judicial 
review among the members of the judiciary. Its acceptance among 
members of the populace is indicated by the fact that the court 
ultimately prevailed, creating a separate system of superior chancery 
courts later that year. 329 
Constitution, and the Crisis of Republican Government, 36 WM. & MARY Q. 215,229-30 
( 1 979) (discussing Madison's concerns about judicial review); Ralph L. Ketcham, 
James Madison and judicial Review, 8 SYRACUSE L. REV. 158, 159 (1957) (examining 
Madison's early vacillation regarding the issue of judicial review). 
With respect to the other leading Virginian political thinker, it should be added 
that after 1800,Jefferson retreated from his earlier support of judicial review, perhaps 
in response to Federalist control ofthejudiciary. See Wallace Mendelson.jefferson on 
judicial Review: Consistency Through Change, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 327, 330-32 (1962). 
323 8 Va. (4 Call) 135 (1788). 
324 See Charles F. Hobson, Introduction to 5 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 15, at 
xxiii, xxxi-xxxii. 
325 See 8 Va. (4 Call) at 141-47. The Cases of the judges, as reported by Call, set 
forth a number of related judicial acts. For the judicial protest that followed the 
init.iallegislative response to the Remonstrance, see 8 Va. (4 Call.) at 148-50. 
326 See CULLEN, supra note 8, at 78-81 (discussing the history of the Remonstrance); 
Note to Letter from Charles Lee to George Washington (May 14, 1788), in 9 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 58, at 797, 797-98 n.2 (same). 
327 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20 (1794). 
328 See supra part II.A.3. 
329 See Powell, supra note 294, at 205. 
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Virginia's broad, early acceptance of judicial review is also 
indicated by Turpin v. Locket, 330 a case roughly contemporaneous 
with, though decided the year after, Marbury. At issue in Turpin was 
a controversial Virginia statute that provided for glebe lands, 
traditionally the property of the Episcopalian Church, to be sold to 
benefit the poor. Church vestrymen challenged the statute's 
constitutionality, but Chancellor Wythe ruled against them and 
upheld the statute. The vestryman then appealed to the Virginia 
Court of Appeals, which voted internally, three to one, with Spencer 
Roane dissenting, that the statute was unconstitutional. Pendleton 
drafted the majority opinion, but he died the day he was to deliver 
it, leaving the fate of the statute in the hands of the judge who 
would be named to replace him. If that judge were to vote that the 
statute was unconstitutional, it would be overturned; if Pendleton's 
successor were to vote that the act was constitutional, the court 
would be deadlocked, and Wythe's opinion in favor of the statute 
would control. 331 
The state legislature was anxious that the law be upheld. 
Tucker, still a judge of the general court, was approached and asked 
how he would vote on the question if he were named to the court 
of appeals. He wrote in response that it was improper for him to 
comment on a pending case and that he could not bind himself in 
advance to a vote one way or the other. He did, however, refer his 
questioner to a section of his treatise, in which he had approved of 
a plan before the Virginia legislature that imposed taxes to provide 
for religious education; he suggested that his stance in Turpin could 
be inferred from that passage.332 Charles Cullen, Tucker's biogra-
pher, wrote about the incident: 
When Tucker referred [his correspondent] to his essay he was 
sincere in believing that his mind was not unalterably made up 
concerning the pending case before the Court of Appeals, but at 
the same time he was aware that any legislator could see that he 
thought the state had the right to use its powers for the benefit of 
its Citizens . . . . If he supported this plan [discussed in his 
treatise] for the benefit of Virginia, he most likely would favor the 
sale of vacant glebe lands when the proceeds were to be used to 
benefit its citizens.333 
330 IO Va. (6 Call) II3 (I804). 
331 See 2 MAYS, supra note 6, at 337-45 (discussing the case). 
m See CULLEN, supra note 8, at I75· 77. For the relevant section of Tucker's 
treatise, see I TUCKER, supra note I, at II3-I8. 
m CULLEN, supra note 8, at I77. 
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Tucker was duly named to the court, where he joined Roane in 
upholding the statute's constitutionality. The two-to-two vote of the 
court of appeals left in place Wythe's opinion upholding the 
statute. 334 
The episode obviously shows that legislators were willing to 
manipulate the appointment process in order to have a statute 
upheld. For the purposes of this study, it shows, more importantly, 
the degree of consensus around judicial review in Virginia at the 
time of Marbury. The safest course of action for legislators who 
wanted the statute to be upheld would have been to secure the 
appointment of an opponent of judicial review. That their choice 
was an individual who had repeatedly asserted his belief in judicial 
review (one time as a member of a court that invalidated a statute) 
and who, although he hinted that he would uphold the statute, was 
unwilling to give a flat assurance that he would do so indicates that 
in 1803 no plausible candidates for the court opposed judicial 
rev1ew. 
The most striking evidence of the early consensus in favor of 
judicial review is that every member of the state ratifying convention 
in 1788 who took a position on the legitimacy of judicial review 
spoke in its favor, and that these speakers covered a broad political 
spectrum. For example, Federalist leader George Nicholas ex-
plained that because of judicial review there was no need to be 
concerned that Congress would exceed its powers under the 
Constitution. "[W]ho is to determine the extent of such [ congres-
sional] powers?" he asked rhetorically, and answered, "I say, the 
same power which in all well regulated communities determines the 
extent of Legislative powers-If they exceed these powers, the 
Judiciary will declare it void. "335 Having recently written the 
decision in the Cases of the judges, Chancellor Pendleton, a Federal-
ist, noted that the Virginia state legislature had passed unconstitu-
tional statutes and added, "My brethern (sic] in that department (the 
judicial) felt great uneasiness in their minds, to violate the Constitu-
tion by such a law. They have prevented the operation of some 
unconstitutional acts. "336 Leading Anti-Federalist Patrick Henry 
responded, "The Honorable Gentleman did our Judiciary honour in 
saying, that they had firmness to counteract the Legislature in some 
334 See Turpin, IO Va. (6 Call) at I28 (Tucker,].); id. at I57 (Roane,].). 
335 IO DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 58, at I327. 
336 ld. at II 97 (footnote omitted). 
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cases. Yes, Sir, our Judges opposed the acts of the Legislature. 
They had fortitude to declare that they were the Judiciary and 
would oppose unconstitutional acts. "337 John Marshall himself was 
unambiguous: 
If (Congress] were to make a law not warranted by any of the 
powers enumerated, it would be considered by the Judges as an 
infringement of the Constitution which they are to guard:-They 
would not consider such a law as coming under their jurisdiction.-
They would declare it void.m 
Why Virginians were so supportive of judicial review is a 
question that invites speculation.339 The answer, in part, may be 
that lawyers in Virginia, and the South in general, occupied a 
different place in the political and social structure than they did in 
northern states such as New York and Rhode Island, where judicial 
review proved particularly controversial. As historian Maxwell 
Bloomfield observed, "The distinctive life-style of the southern 
lawyer [enabled him] ... to appeal to community sympathies [more] 
than his more professionalized northern prototype. "340 Lawyers 
in the North, although claiming to be independent professionals 
above the market, were typically dependent on the law for their 
livelihood. Thus, Alexander Hamilton, the lawyer in Rutgers, found 
it necessary at times to leave public life and return to his law 
practice to make money. 341 Because law provided their source of 
337 !d. at 1219 (footnote omitted). 
338 /d. at 1431; see also 9 id. at 1101 (Edmund Randolph opining that a good 
judiciary stands in the way of an oppressive Congress); 10 id. at 1361 (George Mason 
arguing that the federal judiciary has the duty and power to declare ex post facto laws 
unconstitutional); id. at 1420-21 (Patrick Henry asserting that federal courts would 
not allow Congress to prohibit appeals as to facts); id. at 1427 (Edmund Pendleton 
stating that the Constitution prohibits oppressive laws and that "honest independent 
Judges will never admit an oppressive construction"); id. at 1448 (William Grayson 
noting that judges are expected to defend the Constitution against abridgement by 
Congress). 
339 The theories advanced here on why judicial review won acceptance in Virginia 
represent tentative suggestions. I intend to explore more systematically the issue of 
why Virginians and others responded to judicial review in the way that they did in the 
larger study of which this is a part. See supra note t. 
540 MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1776-
1876, at 50-51 ( 1 976). Similarly, contrasting lawyers in the North and South, 
historian E. Lee Shepard has observed that "[t]he successful lawyer-planter, falling 
heir to a tradition of local dominance by a social elite, found favor with many of his 
non-professional neighbors." E. Lee Shepard, Lawyers Look at Themselves: Professional 
Consciousness and the Virginia Bar, 1770-1850, 25 AM.J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 10 (1981). 
341 See GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 345-46 
(1992) (describing Hamilton's self-image as a gentleman-lawyer). 
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income, lawyers were a distinct economic interest group, and one 
that other politically powerful interest groups, such as merchants 
and farmers, would not want to have supervise the political process 
through judicial review. 
In contrast, Virginia lawyers, like lawyers in other parts of the 
South, were typically planters for whom the law resembled an 
avocation. Thus, the lawyer-planter Thomas Jefferson lauded law 
for its value in politics and in service to the community: "[The 
study of law] qualifies a man to be useful to himself, to his neigh-
bors, and to the public. It is the most certain stepping stone to 
preferment in the political line. "342 Historian F. Thornton Miller 
has recently observed: "[F]ew lawyers and judges wished to desert 
the heritage that gave social prestige in the Old Dominion. Either 
the plantation was not given up upon pursuing a legal career, or, if 
one did gain wealth through a law practice, a plantation was 
acquired." 343 The lawyers whose notes have been discussed herein 
illustrate this concept of lawyer as gentleman. Born to wealth, 
Randolph, in addition to being a successful lawyer, owned a number 
of plantations.344 Trained as a lawyer, Tucker did not actually 
begin to practice until he had achieved wealth through trade and 
through marriage to a widow who owned three plantations, which 
he then ran for several years. 345 Rather than presenting a chal-
lenge to the planter elite, such lawyers were part of it. 
Thus, the differing nature of legal practice may in part explain 
why the initial response to judicial review was more favorable in the 
South (Virginia and North Carolina) than in the North (New York 
and Rhode Island). Beyond this, it appears that in Virginia the law 
played a particularly strong role in reinforcing the gentry's social 
and political control and this may account for the particular ease 
with which judicial review was accepted in the state. "Command of 
the law," historian Rhys Isaac has written, "sustained this social 
342 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Mann Randolph,Jr. (May 30, 1790), 
in 16 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 449 Qulian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1961 ); see also 
WOOD, supra note 341, at 346 (discussing this remark and the concept of law as an 
avocation). 
'
4
' F. THORNTON MILLER, JUDGES AND JURIES VERSUS THE LAW: VIRGINIA'S 
PROVINCIAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVE, 1783-1828, at 107 (1 994); see also A.G. ROEBER, 
FAITHFUL MAGISTRATES AND REPUBLICAN LAWYERS: CREATORS OF VIRGINIA LEGAL 
CULTURE, 1680-1810, at 53 (1981) (commenting on the "fluid and ill-defined 
boundaries between offices and occupations of'planter,' 'lawyer,' 'merchant,' and so 
on" in late-17th- and early-18th-century Virginia). 
544 See REARDON, supra note 9, at 3, 193. 
'
45 See CULLEN, supra note 8, at 20-23. 
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supremacy of the gentry, "346 and to illustrate this point he quotes 
the satirist James Reid, "[The gentry] diligently search the Scrip-
tures, but the scriptures which they search are the Laws of Virginia: 
for though you may find innumerable families in which there is no 
Bible, yet you will not find one without a Law-book. "347 Political 
control, legal control, and economic control were joined in a unitary 
elite. According to Isaac: 
Under the old [colonial] regime the county courts had meshed 
closely with a House of Burgesses that was, in accordance with 
ancient traditions of authority, a county court writ large. Under 
the new form of [postrevolutionary] government ... the elected 
representatives continued to be drawn largely from among the 
justices of the county bench.348 
This suggests that judicial review may have won easy acceptance 
in Virginia because the bench and bar were controlled by the same 
type of people (and to some extent the same people) who dominat-
ed the political process. Participants in the political process were 
favorably disposed towards the bench and bar, and towards judicial 
review. Thus, whenJefferson wrote Madison in 1789, his argument 
that there should be a judicially enforceable federal bill of rights was 
explicitly linked to his faith in the judgment of the members of the 
Virginia Court of Appeals: 
In the arguments in favor of a declaration of rights, you omit one 
which has great weight with me, the legal check which it puts into 
the hands of the judiciary. This is a body, which if rendered 
independent, and kept strictly to their own department merits 
great confidence for their learning and integrity. In fact what 
degree of confidence would be too much for a body composed of 
such men as [court of appeals judges] Wythe, Blair, and Pend-
leton? On characters like these the "civium ardor prava juben-
tium" would make no impression.349 
All of this suggests an alternative view of Marshall and Marbury. 
Scholars typically discuss the judicial review aspect of Marbury in 
"
6 ISAAC, supra note 276, at 133. 
w /d. 
'
48 /d. at 320. 
"
9 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 15, 1789), in 14 PAPERS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 342, at 659, 660. The Latin reference is to Horace: 
"justum et tenacem propositi virum/non civium ardor prava iubentium," HORACE: THE 
ODES AND EPODES 178 (C. E. Bennett trans., rev. ed. 1968), which translates as, "The 
man tenacious of his purpose in a righteous cause is not shaken from his firm resolve 
by the frenzy of his fellow-citizens bidding what is wrong." /d. at 179. 
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one of two ways. The more familiar view-the one that Professor 
Robert Clinton in his recent study of judicial review and Marbury 
observes has "remained the starting point for discussion ... in the 
modern era"350-situates Marbury in the context of the political 
struggles, at the start of the Jefferson administration, between the 
Republican legislature and executive and the Federalist judiciary 
that was seeking to check the other branches of government. When 
William Marbury brought suit in the United States Supreme Court 
seeking a writ of mandamus directing Secretary of State James 
Madison to deliver to him the Justice of the Peace commission that 
President Adams had signed on his last day in office, Marshall was 
placed in a seemingly impossible situation. According to Professor 
Robert McCloskey: 
If [Marshall and his Court] upheld Marbury and ordered delivery 
of the commission, the order would surely be ignored by Madison, 
the Court would be exposed as impotent to enforce its mandates, 
the shakiness of judicial prestige would be dramatically empha-
sized. If on the other hand they did not uphold Marbury, they 
would give aid and comfort to Jefferson and might seem to 
support his denunciation of the "midnight appointments."m 
Marshall's masterstroke was to hold unconstitutional Section 13 of 
the Judiciary Act of 1789, the statutory provision providing that the 
Supreme Court had original jurisdiction in the matter. Thus he 
established judicial review, which the Federalists devoutly desired, 
while giving the Republicans the result they wanted (a loss for 
Marbury) and overturning legislation that the Federalists had 
enacted in the first place. McCloskey writes: 
The decision was criticized for its dictum that the executive could 
be called to account by judicial process, but since the requested 
writ was in fact denied, no really great heat was generated even on 
this point. And as for the argument for judicial review, at the time 
only the Federalists paid much attention to it, and they of course 
were warmly approving.352 
'
50 CLINTON, supra note 3, at 219. See generally id. at 211-23 (discussing 20th-
century interpretations of Marbury); james M. O'Fallon, Marbury, 44 STAN. L. REV. 
219, 219-20 n.3 (1992) (describing Robert McCloskey's view of Marbury, discussed at 
infra text accompanying notes 351-52, as accepted by students as "dogma"). 
O'Fallon's article is a recent example of a work that stresses the political dimensions 
of Marshall's opinion, although O'Fallon departs from the standard view by 
emphasizing the defensive quality of Marshall's position. 
m ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 41 (1960). 
'
52 ld. at 43. 
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Marbury is thus, to quote Professor Clinton, a kind of "coup d'etat, 
engineered for political purposes. "353 
The alternate (and not necessarily inconsistent) view of Marbury 
is that Marshall's embrace of judicial review was correct on 
originalist grounds. Charles Beard has offered the classic historical 
defense of this position.354 Professor Felix Frankfurter proclaimed 
Beard's analysis of Framers' contemporaneous statements about 
judicial review dispositive,355 and Alexander Bickel, in rejecting 
the claim that Marbury involved "usurpation," also invoked Beard 
and stated: 
[I]t is as clear as such matters can be that the Framers of the 
Constitution specifically, if tacitly, expected that the federal courts 
would assume a power-of whatever exact dimensions-to pass on 
the constitutionality of actions of the Congress and the President, 
as well as of the several states."356 
Similarly, Professor Clinton has recently written, "[T]he Court's 
refusal to apply Section 13 in Marbury was consistent with Lockean 
values, existing legal precedent, and the theory of judicial function 
embodied in the Constitution. "357 
The Case of the Prisoners and the early history of judicial review 
in Virginia suggest a different way both to view the case and to read 
Marshall's opinion: Marshall was the product of a legal and political 
culture that was particularly amenable to judicial review-indeed, 
from all appearances, uniquely amenable to judicial review. It 
should be noted at the outset that the sketchy quality of the 
preserved Marshall papers-for example, departing from convention, 
he did not keep copies of his own correspondence-makes it 
impossible to trace with certainty the evolution of Marshall's 
thinking about judicial review. 358 Nonetheless, consideration of 
Marshall in the context of the history of judicial review in his home 
state is illuminating.359 
m CLINTON, supra note 3, at 219. 
~54 See CHARLES A. BEARD, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 46-82, 
108-118 (1912) (analyzing Marbury and the evidence at the time of framing 
concerning judicial review). 
m See Felix Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1002, I 003 
n.4 (1924). 
~56 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT 
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 15 (1962). 
m CLINTON, supra note 3, at 103 
~58 See Introduction to 1 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 15, at xix, xxi. 
~59 For an earlier and interesting attempt to place Marshall's thought more 
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Marshall received his legal education at the College of William 
and Mary in 1780 under George Wythe.360 Wythe delivered the 
eloquent statement in favor of judicial review in the Case of the 
Prisoners previously discussed and, as also previously noted, it 
appears that Marshall was in the courtroom when that opinion was 
delivered. 361 It is noteworthy that, while Wythe trained only a 
relatively small part of the Virginia bar-under 200 lawyers-he 
educated not only Marshall, but jefferson, Tucker, and Roane, all of 
whom were important early champions of judicial review. 362 More 
broadly, Wythe and, to an even greater extent, Pendleton were 
Marshall's role models, and, before the Federal Constitutional 
Convention, each had written a pro-judicial review opinion: 
Wythe's opinion in the Case of the Prisoners being matched by 
Pendleton's in the Remonstrance of the Judges. In Marbury, then, 
Marshall was following the path established years before by the 
jurists whom he most admired. 363 
Fully appreciating the link between Marshall's experience in 
Virginia with his decision in Marbury, however, requires more than 
a recognition of the fact that the judiciary in that state had asserted 
the power to review statutes well before Marbury. More important, 
it requires recognition of the fact that judicial review had been 
remarkably uncontroversial in that state. The Case of the Prisoners 
and its aftermath illustrate the acceptance of judicial review, an 
acceptance that arguably occurred because the legal and political 
structure of the state meant that vesting power in the judiciary to 
review statutes was not perceived as posing a threat to the political 
process. Thus, Marshall spent his career as a legal practitioner in 
an environment in which judicial review was relatively unproblem-
atic, and he was shaped by a legal and political structure amenable 
to judicial review. Due to his Virginian background, Marshall, at the 
time of Marbury, must have found the question of judicial review to 
generally in the context of his Virginia experience, see William E. Nelson, The 
Eighteenth-Century Background of john Marshall's Constitutional jurisprudence, 76 MICH. 
L. REV. 893 (I978). 
%o See Charles T. Cullen, New Light on john Marshall's Legal Education and 
Admission to the Bar, I6 AM. j. LEGAL HIST. 345, 345-46 (I 972). 
361 See supra text accompanying note IS. 
362 See HORSNELL,supra note 302, at 5-6 (noting that Roane studied under Wythe); 
Carrington, supra note II, at 537 (stating that Jefferson and Tucker studied under 
Wythe). 
363 See Introduction to 5 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note IS, at xxiii, lvii-lviii (stating 
that Marbury was Marshall's attempt, at a national level, to replicate what Wythe's and 
Pendleton's decisions accomplished at the state level). 
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be an old one-and one that, for him and for the legal and political 
community he knew best, had been resolved long before. The 
often-remarked upon "self-confiden[t]"-to use Professor Mc-
Closkey's term-tone of Marbury reflects this. 364 In beginning the 
discussion of judicial review in that case, Marshall declared that to 
resolve the "question, whether an act repugnant to the constitution, 
can become the law of the land ... [i]t seems only necessary to 
recognise certain principles, supposed to have been long and well 
established. "365 
For someone who had witnessed the Case of the Prisoners and its 
aftermath in Virginia, the principles that Marshall then enumerat-
ed-the superiority of the Constitution to a statute and the Court's 
power to disregard a statute in conflict with the Constitution366-
must have seemed "long and well established."367 
CONCLUSION 
While the revolutionary-era cases in which courts were asked to 
decide whether they had the power to declare statutes unconstitu-
tional have been the subject of constant study for over one hundred 
years, the notes of two of the attorneys who participated in the Case 
of the Prisoners-St. George Tucker and Virginia Attorney General 
Edmund Randolph-have escaped scrutiny. These documents pro-
vide our best evidence of how the framing generation believed a 
court should construe a constitution when determining whether to 
hold a statute unconstitutional. This Article uses those notes and 
other primary sources to construct a record of the case. That 
record is significant for two reasons. First, it provides evidence that 
the Framers of the Federal Constitution had available to them 
interpretive approaches that held that the subjective intent of the 
Framers was relevant to constitutional interpretation and that a 
constitution should be construed in accordance with its spirit, not 
just its text. Second, placing Marshall's decision in Marbury in the 
context of the Case of the Prisoners and early Virginia constitutional 
history-as opposed to in the context of national political and 
constitutional history-suggests that Marshall's commitment to 
judicial review can be understood as having been shaped by the fact 
364 MCCLOSKEY, supra note 351, at 42. 
365 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803). 
366 See id. at 178. 
367 /d. at 176. 
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that he was a citizen of the state in which judicial review won early 
and easy acceptance. 
